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ABSTRACT
We empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Reg FD") by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000. This rule was intended to stop the
practice of "selective disclosure," in which companies give material information only to a few
analysts and institutional investors prior to disclosing it publicly. We find that the adoption of Reg
FD caused a significant reallocation of information-producing resources, resulting in a welfare loss
for small firms, which now face a higher cost of capital. The loss of the "selective disclosure"
channel for information flows could not be compensated for via other information transmission
channels. This effect was more pronounced for firms communicating complex information and,
consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, for those losing analyst coverage. Moreover, we
find no significant relationship of the different responses with litigation risks and agency costs. Our
results suggest that Reg FD had unintended consequences and that "information" in financial





















In this paper we empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (“Reg FD”) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  Reg FD, 
which took effect on October 23, 2000, was intended to stop the practice of “selective 
disclosure,” in which companies give material information only to certain selected analysts and 
institutional investors prior to disclosing it publicly.
1 The adoption of the rule was extremely 
controversial.
2  Proponents argued that selective disclosure was unfair, that it undermined the 
integrity of capital markets.  Opponents asserted that information transfer between companies and 
investors would deteriorate, that there would be a “chilling effect” on communication between 
firms and investors.
3 To provide an evaluation of Reg FD it is important to understand both how 
information is transmitted from firms to capital markets and how the allocation of information-
producing resources affects securities prices. We find that the adoption of Reg FD caused a 
significant reallocation of information-producing resources, resulting in a welfare loss for small 
firms, which now face a higher cost of capital.  The loss of the “selective disclosure” channel for 
information flows could not be compensated for via other information transmission channels. 
This unintended consequence of Reg FD shows that “information” in financial markets is more 
complicated than current theory admits and has some public policy implications. 
There were three reasons given by the SEC for the adoption of Reg FD. First, it was 
argued that selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence. If small investors fear that 
insiders will regularly profit at their expense, they will not be nearly as willing to invest. For 
example, Arthur Levitt (1999) (then SEC chairman) argued that: “…the behind-the-scenes 
feeding of material non-public information from companies to analysts is a stain on our markets. 
This selectiveness is a disservice to investors and it undermines the fundamental principle of 
                                                 
1 “Selective disclosure” is not the same as insider trading.  “Selective disclosure” means revealing material 
nonpublic information by a corporate insider to an analyst, information which could be used profitably.  
“Insider trading” refers to trading on the basis of material nonpublic information by a company’s own 
officers and directors in the absence of disclosure to the SEC.  Other investors could engage in illegal 
insider trading by trading based on nonpublic information received from a corporate insider.  Rule 10b-5 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sets out that trading on the basis of material nonpublic information is 
prohibited. 
2 The SEC received nearly 6,000 comment letters.  See SEC Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading (2000).  Arthur Levitt, the then SEC chairman, describes the intense political environment in 
which Reg FD was finally adopted.  See Levitt (2002). 
3 Laura Unger,  the only commissioner to vote against FD,  was at least partially sympathetic to the 
arguments of both Wall Street and public companies.  She previously voiced concern that FD would 
compromise the integrity of American public markets by decreasing the level and quality of 
communication between companies and investors, a point Wall Street has pressed since even before its 
enactment. A survey of analysts administered by the Association of Investment Management and Research   2
fairness.” The reason, according to the SEC, is that “...those who were privy to the information 
beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark” 
(SEC (2000, p.2)). This has been a long-standing concern, at the root of mandatory disclosure in 
general.
4 
A second rationale concerned the link between corporate governance and the incentives 
to engage in selective disclosure.  This problem was the use of information by management to 
essentially bribe analysts, perhaps in exchange for a quid pro quo, i.e., “…the potential for 
corporate management to treat material information as a commodity to be used to gain or 
maintain favor with particular analysts or investors” (SEC (2000, p. 3)).  In other words, a CEO 
could essentially “spin” or “frame” information about his company by trading it in exchange for 
favorable analyst reports or kickbacks, e.g., allocations in initial public offerings.  In fact, the 
SEC also noted the problem that (prior to Reg FD) “analysts may feel pressured to report 
favorably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued access to 
selectively disclosed information” (see SEC (2000)).
5 
Finally, the SEC stated the view that selective disclosure is not required for market 
efficiency because of technological change: “…technological limitations no longer provide an 
excuse for abiding the threats to market integrity that selective disclosure represents” (Release, 65 
Fed. Reg. at 51716).  As one SEC commissioner put it: “The mechanisms by which our markets 
become efficient are changing…Institutions and analysts’ brokerage firms are no longer the 
primary means by which our markets achieve efficiency” (Hunt (2000)).  The basic idea seems to 
be that companies can now use websites and/or “webcast” conference calls via the internet, 
making the channel of information flow from firm managements to analysts less important. 
The intention of Reg FD was not to change the informativeness of prices, that is, market 
efficiency.  According to Laura Unger, the acting SEC Chairman after Arthur Levitt’s term 
ended, “the impetus for Regulation FD was to prevent analysts from passing material nonpublic 
information on to others so that those individuals could trade” (SEC (2000)).  The way in which 
communication occurred was to change, but not the information content of what is transmitted 
from firms to markets. Under the Reg FD regime instead of a firm’s management selectively 
                                                                                                                                                 
(AIMR) found that 57 percent believe the volume of substantive information decreased in the six months 
after FD was enacted. 
4 Government-mandated disclosure of information by corporations dates from the New Deal era and has 
always been controversial. See Loss (1983). 
5 The canonical example of this quid pro quo is the twenty-one of the hottest IPOs that were allocated in 
part to Bernie Ebbers of Worldcom by Jack Grubman and Salomon Smith Barney apparently in exchange 
for the selective disclosure of information by Ebbers to Grubman.  See Lowenstein (2004).   3
communicating with one or a few analysts, firm management would say the same thing publicly. 
The same information would be released, but without privately benefiting particular analysts and 
managers. 
Is Reg FD a desirable public policy?  Clearly, it is difficult to assess notions of “fairness,” 
even if that is interpreted to mean social welfare. Our view is that some assessment is warranted 
in order to understand public policies with regard to disclosure in securities markets, in particular, 
Reg FD.
6 We focus on assessing the effects of Reg FD on information production and 
transmission in capital markets; we ask whether the same information is transmitted to capital 
markets since the passage of Reg FD, just via a different channel now (albeit in a possibly 
“fairer” way), or whether, for some reason, there is less information transmitted to capital 
markets. We view this issue as of independent interest.  Little is known about whether the sources 
of information or the costs of producing the information have any impact on firm values and 
security prices. Ultimately, we care about the effects on security prices and the resulting 
allocation of resources. We use the natural experiment of the adoption of Reg FD to investigate 
these issues. 
Information can be transmitted from firms to markets via four channels: (1) firms, in 
addition to mandatory disclosures, can disclose information to the public voluntarily (e.g., 
earnings pre-announcements); (2) firms can selectively disclose information, e.g., phone calls, or 
one-on-one meetings; (3) “sell side” analysts can produce research which is released to the 
public, e.g., analysts reports; (4) private information can be produced by outsiders, “informed 
traders,” who then trade on the basis of their information.
7 Reg FD sought to eliminate the second 
channel of information flow, under the implicit assumption that the same information would still 
flow into markets but by the other channels, particularly channel (1). But, Reg FD also affects 
channel (3) because the biggest impact of Reg FD is on analysts. Reg FD “has made most 
analysts stock-guessers rather than [stock-] pickers because they do not receive that wink and nod 
from company management” (Syre and Stein (2001, p. F1)). Consequently, some have predicted 
that Reg FD will either lead to a diminished role for analysts since the information will now be 
available for everyone or a large-scale reduction in analysts’ jobs since many simply cannot 
perform an adequate analysis without the aid of selective disclosure (Coffee (2000)).  If analysts’ 
previous role is subsumed by the other channels of information flow, then market efficiency is not 
changed. This is the logic of Reg FD that is our focus. 
                                                 
6 It is not, however, our intention to assess the idea of mandatory disclosure generally.  There is a large 
literature on that topic.  Recent examples include Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) and Greenstone, 
Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003).   4
Our main empirical strategy is to explore various cross-sectional differences among firms 
pre- and post-Reg FD.  In this regard, our prior belief is that there are important cross sectional 
differences with regard to firm size. There are two reasons to believe that Reg FD had different 
impacts on firms of different size.  First, there is survey evidence.  A survey of members of the 
securities bar by the American Bar Association (2001) found that 67 percent of respondents 
believed that Reg FD had a greater impact on small and mid-cap companies than on large-cap 
companies. A survey by the National Investor Relations Institute (2001) found that the fraction of 
firms that responded that less information was being provided post-FD was higher for low-cap 
firms when compared to the group of mid- and high-cap firms. The same survey found that the 
fraction of firms that perceived a decrease in analyst following post-FD was higher for the group 
of low-cap firms, while the fraction of firms that perceived an increase in analyst following was 
higher for the group of big firms 
Secondly, there are theoretical reasons to believe that there is a link between firm size 
and the amount of information produced.  King, Pownall and Waymire (1990) argue that large 
firms have better disclosure policies because the incentives for private information acquisition are 
greater in their case. Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that production of information entails 
fixed costs and thus disclosure costs per unit of size are more likely to decrease with size.     
Moreover, Goshen and Parshomovsky (2001) argue that small firms may need selective 
disclosure of information to maintain and/or attract analyst following, because for small firm 
liquidity may be so low that the costs of obtaining private information may be higher than the 
gains from selling or trading on private information. 
Our main finding is that there was a reallocation of information-producing resources and 
that this reallocation had asset pricing effects.  We document that small firms on average lost 17 
percent of their analyst following, and big firms increased theirs by seven percent, on average.  
Moreover, while big firms are almost twice as likely to make voluntary earnings announcements 
(pre-announcements), small firms did not increase their pre-announcements significantly. We find 
consistent effects of this reallocation on earnings forecast errors and market responses to earnings 
announcements: small firms experience higher forecast errors (Agrawal and Chadha (2002) find 
similar results) and volatility, consistent with a higher information gap; no significant increases 
occur for big firms. These results suggest that big firms were able to replace the loss of channel 
(2) with channels (1) and (3), but that small firms were not able to do so.  
                                                                                                                                                 
7 This could include illegal trading based on inside information (by the legal definition); see Loss (1983).   5
We demonstrate that this reallocation resulted in a higher cost of capital for small firms 
(and no significant change for big firms). Grossman and Stiglitz (1987) were the first to recognize 
that the costs of producing information have asset pricing effects; several other papers that 
followed focused on the link between disclosure of information and the cost of capital (recently 
Easley and O’Hara (2003); see also the survey by Verrecchia (2001)). Our empirical results 
suggest that increases in the costs of producing information had a measurable impact on the asset 
prices of small firms. We also find evidence in support of the investor recognition hypothesis of 
Merton (1987). The stocks of small firms that completely lost analyst coverage after Reg FD 
experienced significant increases in the cost of capital, while small stocks with no previous 
analyst coverage—which presumably did not have any analysts benefiting from selective 
disclosure pre-FD—experienced no significant change in the cost of capital.  
Information disclosed by firms differs in its complexity and in its litigation risk (risk of 
shareholder lawsuits), and these factors could explain why different firms responded to the 
regulation differently. We find that more complex firms (using intangible assets as a proxy for 
complexity) overall are being more adversely affected by the policy change than less complex 
firms.  After controlling for size, we find that the subgroups of firms with high intangibles tend to 
suffer a significantly bigger loss of analyst following than the subgroup of firm with low 
intangibles, and larger increases in the cost of capital. The changes in public voluntary disclosure 
are consistent with the view that the public channel is an imperfect substitute for private 
communications, especially with respect to complex information, and this effect is reflected in 
variables such as the cost of capital.  Aumann and Hart (2003) provide a theoretical 
demonstration that more is “achieved by a long conversation than by a single message—even 
when one side is strictly better informed than the other” (p. 1619).
8  Also, we find no evidence of 
a chilling effect of Reg FD on high litigation risk firms, a concern expressed by some critics in 
their comments on initial drafts of the regulation. This finding is consistent with high litigation 
risk firms making less use of selective disclosure pre-FD or with the final draft of the regulation 
properly mitigating criticism regarding legal liability concerns (SEC (2000)). 
                                                 
8 The idea that one-on-one communication, where there are long conversations, might be valuable is one of 
the reasons that courts did not interpret the existing laws to prohibit selective disclosure.  In general, courts 
have been sympathetic to the difficulties of legally overseeing communication between managers and 
analysts, describing such discussions as “a fencing match conducted on a tightrope,” in which the managers 
are “compelled to parry often incisive questioning while teetering on the fine line between data properly 
conveyed and material inside information that may not be publicly revealed” (SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 
F. 2d 8, p.9 (2d Cir. 1977’ quoted in Tishbi (2002)).  To protect such communication the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided a series of cases, most notably Dirks v. SEC (463 U.S. 646 (1983)), in which managers and 
analysts were shielded from liability (see Tishbi (2002)).   6
We test for a link between agency problems and incentives to make selective disclosures. 
To proxy for the degree of agency costs we use the corporate governance provisions in firms’ 
charters and by-laws and state takeover laws (see Gompers et al. (2003)) to break-up the sample 
into groups of firms with “good” and “bad” governance.  We show that analyst following exhibits 
a significantly higher increase in the good governance sample, but there is no significant 
difference between the two groups based on all other measures that we follow, such as pre-
announcements, forecast errors, volatility, and the cost of capital.  This result is consistent with 
the view that bad governance firms became less attractive to analysts relative to the good 
governance firms, because perhaps now they cannot be “spoon fed” information anymore, but 
this reallocation has had no significant asset pricing effects.  
Several papers examine the impact of Reg FD in the information environment.  There is a 
consensus in the literature that the quantity of voluntary public disclosures increased as reported 
in, for example, Heflin et al. (2003), Bailey et al. (2003), and Straser (2002). However, the 
evidence is mixed on other relevant aspects such as the dispersion and accuracy of analyst 
forecasts, volatility around earnings announcement, and the degree of information asymmetry and 
informed trading. For example, with respect to the accuracy or dispersion of analyst forecasts, 
Shane, et al. (2001) and Heflin, et al. (2003) find no significant change in either, and Bailey et al. 
(2003) find no increase in the accuracy but significant increases in dispersion. However, Agrawal 
and Chadha (2002) and Mohanram and Sunder (2001) find increases in both, and Irani and 
Karamanou (2002) find increases in dispersion. On measures of the information gap, like return 
volatility around earnings announcement, Heflin, et al. (2003), Shane, et al. (2001), and 
Eleswarapu, et al. (2002) find decreases, but Bailey et al. (2003) find no increase after controlling 
for important factors.  Similarly, with respect to the level of information asymmetry reflected in 
trading costs, Eleswarapu, et al. (2002) find that it decreases, consistent with SEC goals to level 
the playing field, but Straser (2002) finds opposite results. Other studies that explored interesting 
aspects of Reg FD include Bushee et al. (2003), who analyzed how firms previously using closed 
or open conference calls responded to the rule change, and Jorion et al. (2003), who investigated 
whether credit rating agencies -- exempted from the application of Reg FD -- gained an 
informational advantage. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 contains a discussion of the data sets and broad 
methodology.  In Section 3 we investigate the reallocation of information-producing resources 
following the enactment of Reg FD. In Section 4 we look at the effects of this reallocation, in 
terms of the effects on earnings forecast errors, market responses to earnings announcements, and 
the cost of capital.  In Section 5 we investigate whether characteristics aside from size help   7
explain the results. Some robustness results are discussed in Section 6.  The implications for 
inferences about information and public policy are in the final section, Section 7.  
2.  Data and Methodology 
We collect NYSE and NASDAQ firm-quarter observations from CSRP for the period 
1997:2002 and merge them with information from First Call (actual earnings announcements, 
analysts forecasts and pre-announcements), COMPUSTAT (accounting data) and IRRC 
(corporate governance index).  The Appendix describes details on the construction of our sample. 
Motivated by the previous discussion, many tests are based on a break-up of the sample 
according to firm size. Each firm is allocated to one of three groups based on its average size 
during the entire sample period, 1997-2002. The group of small firms is formed by taking firms 
with average size below the 50
th percentile of the distribution; the group of mid-size firms is 
formed by firms with average size between the 50
th and the 80
th percentiles and the group of big 
firms is formed by firms in the upper quintile of the distribution (see Appendix for details). 
We analyze the effects of Reg FD on market variables (analyst following, use of pre-
announcements, forecast error and volatility at earnings announcements) by running panel data 
(cross-sectional time series) fixed-effects regressions on the variables of interest.  For each such 
variable, we run panel data regressions with the aggregated data from the pre-FD and post-FD 
subsamples, using as explanatory variables one or more variables related to the Reg FD period 
and other variables that control for factors other than Reg FD. Panel data regression is particularly 
interesting in that it allows for a better treatment of the omitted variables problem (in fact, in 
many setups, the primary motivation for using panel data is to solve this omitted variables 
problem).
9  Using fixed effects panel data is equivalent to running a regression with a dummy for 
each firm in the sample. These dummies control for each firm’s fixed effects, i.e. for cross-
sectional differences that are due to firms’ fixed characteristics. Adding these firms’ dummies 
also simplifies the data collection, since any control variable that can be deemed a firm 
characteristic (i.e., one that that does not change through time) does not need to be included in the 
                                                 
9 In general, if in a regression specification the set of explanatory variables does not
 include a variable (the 
omitted one!) which itself is correlated with at least one of the explanatory variables, then typical –in this 
case, pooled - OLS results are biased and inconsistent. In a panel data setup, the inclusion of a ci intercept 
specific to each cross-sectional unit allows the regression to capture this omitted variable as long as it is 
(roughly) constant through time.   8
regression, because its effects will be absorbed by the firm’s dummy in the panel data 
specification.
10 
Panel data allows us also to maximize the use of the data in the time series dimension. First, 
by including all available data in just one regression, we avoid the difficulties of identifying 
effects that occur gradually through time. If firms gradually adapt to the new regulation, using 
shorter periods (e.g., regressing data for one period post-FD and one corresponding period pre-
FD) may fail to identify Reg FD effects even if they do happen. Moreover, by using longer period 
data we reduce the likelihood of spuriously interpreting circumstantial patterns over shorter 
periods as effects of the regulation. On the other hand, increasing the time span of our 
examination increases the risk that some market effects being examined here might be driven by 
some contemporaneous economic factors not related to Reg FD;
 11 this risk can be attenuated by 
using proper control variables in the multivariate regressions. 
3.  The Post-Reg FD Reallocation of Information-Producing Resources 
In this section we first investigate whether there is a change in information production by 
analysts (channel (3)), and then we look at whether firms have changed the use of voluntary 
disclosures (pre-announcements) – channel (1). 
A.  The Reallocation of Analysts 
Analyst following is an important part of a firm’s information environment.
12,13 In order 
to proxy for the activity of production of public information by market professionals, we track 
                                                 
10 In a panel data setup, one always faces the issue of whether to adopt the fixed or random effects model. A 
basic requirement for using random effects is that the effect ci must be uncorrelated with the other 
explanatory variables. This requirement seems very stringent when referring to firm’s characteristics. 
Fortunately, the requirement is dropped for the fixed effects model. The drawback of using fixed effects - 
that there is no way to distinguish the effects of time-constant observable characteristics from the time-
constant fixed effects term ci - is not an issue here since we are mainly interested in the effect of Reg FD, 
which is not a time-constant characteristic. The other important requirement for the estimation of (both 
fixed and random effects) panel data is strict exogeneity, which implies that explanatory variables in each 
time period be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error in each time period; it does not seem to present a 
concern in our specification. 
11 In this regard, we decided to end the post-FD period in the 3
rd quarter of 2002 even though data beyond 
that quarter is already available. The increasing scrutiny of the analysts’ industry by the media and 
regulators (e.g. the Global Settlement of May 2003) is an example of another exogenous shock that could 
affect the allocation of analysts; thus, it would be difficult to isolate effects from Reg FD from this shock if 
data from more recent periods were used. 
12 There is a long list of papers that examine the activity of security analysts as a component of the firm’s 
information environment. Some examples are: Bhushan (1989a), Brennan and Hughes (1990), Shores 
(1990), Skinner (1990) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995).  
13 We are abstracting from what motivates the analysts to produce earnings forecasts for the firm. Brennan 
and Hughes (1991), for example, argue that the analysts are rewarded by brokerage commissions, in that   9
analyst following of firms by sell-side financial analysts.
14 Sell-side analysts release different 
kinds of information, from forecasts about upcoming financial releases to more complex text 
reports analyzing the firm’s status, future prospects, state of the industry, etc. These text reports 
are subjective, qualitative in nature and not broadly tracked by financial databases, making it very 
difficult to statistically analyze them. None of these shortcomings are present for data on financial 
analysts’ forecasts of upcoming earnings releases.  Moreover, earnings forecasts are closely 
tracked, and they can be compared with the subsequent actual earnings releases, so we can extract 
a simple measure of the quality of the analyst’s research.  Thus, we adopt the release of sell-side 
earnings forecasts as our proxy for information production by market research professionals 
(hereafter referred to as “analyst following”). 
  Our first measure of analyst following is NOFORi,q: the number of outstanding analyst 
forecasts for firm i’s upcoming earnings release for quarter q, released up to 2 days before the 
quarter q’s actual earnings release. However, since we are trying to examine the determinants of 
this variable along a time series dimension, we have to worry about possible time trends in the 
market for financial analysts. To tackle this issue, we define a measure of standardized analysts 
following,  NOFOR_STDi,q, which is computed by dividing NOFORi,q  by the total amount of 
analyst forecasts available for all firms in quarter q. Roughly speaking, NOFOR_STDi,q is firm i’s 
share of the market for financial analysts in quarter q, measured in percentage terms.
15  
  Table 1 presents univariate statistics on analyst following before and after Reg FD. Panel 
A reports results based on all the sample data. They indicate that, after Reg FD is adopted, there 
is a significant increase in the average number of forecasts accompanied by a decrease in the 
median number of forecasts, which might suggest a shift in the distribution of the number of 
forecasts, with the mass being more concentrated on the right side of the distribution.
16 The 
results in Panel B, which repeat the univariate statistics for each group of firms based on size, 
                                                                                                                                                 
investors will trade only on stocks they “know about”, that is, stocks for which earnings forecasts have 
been produced by analysts. 
14 Analyst following involves both buy-side and sell-side professionals.  Buy-side analysts generally 
produce information to trade on. Their research output is generally not available to the public. Sell-side 
analysts produce information that is sold to a broader class of clients, so their research does become public. 
Data availability limits us to sell-side analysts but, more importantly, sell-side analysts provide information 
that is more publicly available than information produced by buy-side analysts, and thus is a better proxy 
for the production of public information by market professionals.  
15 Notice that our measures of a firm’s analyst following are more informative than simply counting the 
analysts that are assigned to that firm. This is because being assigned to do research on a firm does not 
imply necessarily that any information will actually be produced; in other words, releasing a forecast is a  
signal that an analyst is actively tracking a firm. 
16 The difference in the mean standardized number of forecasts is driven by the fact that the two samples 
have different sizes. If the two samples had the same size then the mean values would be exactly the same.   10
allow us to better assess the shift in the distribution of the number of forecasts. The average 
number of forecasts significantly increases for the big firms and decreases for small firms, and the 
results are robust to using the standardized measure of analyst following.  For the portfolio of 
mid-size firms, the results are not clear cut: the average number of forecasts seems to increase, 
but one cannot reject the hypotheses that the median number of forecasts and the standardized 
measures of analyst following are the same for the periods pre- and post-FD. 
  Overall, the univariate show a reallocation of analyst coverage after Reg FD was adopted, 
with big firms enjoying an increase in analyst following at the expense of a decrease in analyst 
following of small firms. However, a multivariate analysis is necessary in order to control for 
other factors that might influence analyst following as well as to avoid biases from the portfolio 
formation procedure. In the multivariate setup, we estimate a panel data (cross-sectional time 
series) fixed effects regression of number of forecasts.  Let the subscript q indicate the quarter of 
the year, and i indicate firm i.  Then the basic regression model is:  
Ni,q=a0iFIRMi+a1 POSTFDi,q+a2 SIZEi,q+a3 LOSSi,q+a4 ABSCARi,q+a5 SIGNCARi,q +εi,q      (1) 
where 
Ni,q  =  Dependent variable, either NOFORi,q or NOFOR_STDi,q 
FIRMi  =  Dummy set to 1 for the i
th firm 
POSTFDi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the data point is observed after Reg FD 
was adopted 
SIZEi,q  =  Log of market value of the firm i at the end of the quarter q 
divided by the market index 
LOSSi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the actual earnings for firm i in quarter 
q are negative 
ABSCARi,q  =  The  absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return for firm 
i in quarter q 
SIGNCARi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the cumulative abnormal return for firm 
i in quarter q is negative 
To assess the importance of Reg FD, we include dummies that identify whether the data 
point is from the period after Reg FD was adopted. These dummies should then capture any effect 
of Reg FD on analyst following. The control variables are motivated by the extant literature on 
analyst following. First, there is overwhelming evidence that SIZE can explain analyst   11
following.
17 The three other explanatory variables – whether the firm is about to release a 
negative earnings report and the recent path of abnormal returns for the firm - are different 
dimensions of firm performance, which might influence an analyst’s decision to track a firm.
18  
  By having one intercept a0i for each company in the sample (estimates for these intercepts 
are not shown), we can abstract from company characteristics that explain analyst following and 
rather focus on determinants of changes in analyst following associated with the adoption of Reg 
FD. The only exception to this rule is the use of SIZE as an explanatory variable; we opt to keep 
SIZE in the regression because in the period over which the panel data is applied – 20 quarters, 
composed of eight quarters pre-FD, four quarters in which Reg FD was put into discussion, 
passed and put into effect, and eight quarters post-FD – a firm might have changed its size to such 
an extent that it would influence analyst following. The other explanatory variables are firm 
characteristics that are clearly dependent on the time-period in which they are measured, and thus 
are not likely to be absorbed by the company fixed effects’ intercept.  
  According to the literature on the determinants of analyst following, there are other 
characteristics that might be necessary to control for when studying analyst following, such as the 
firm’s industry, the firm’s riskiness, variability of earnings, past performance, institutional 
ownership etc. However, these results are mostly based on cross-sectional regression; here the use 
of a panel data is likely to diminish the problems of not including them.  If the variables are firm 
characteristics that do not change much over time, then the firm fixed effect will absorb this.  
This is the case for variables related to industry such as industry membership, whether the 
industry is regulated, etc. Others variables could indeed change over time, but not enough to be 
captured over our sample period. For example, since a proxy for past performance or variability 
of earnings needs a considerable time series (say five or ten years), we do not expect much 
variation on the measure from 1998 to 2002, and therefore its effects will also be embedded in the 
company fixed effects’ intercept.
19  
  The results for the panel data fixed effects of analyst following are reported in Table 2. 
When all the data are examined together, in specifications I and V in panel A of Table 2, the 
                                                 
17 The literature is extensive; examples are Bhushan (1989b), Brennan and Hughes (1991), Lang and 
Lundholm (1993, 1996) and Chung and Jo (1996). 
18 See Bhushan and O’Brien (1990). 
19 The results regarding Reg FD reported here are robust to the inclusion of institutional ownership holdings 
as an explanatory variable in regression (1). However, causality inferences are particularly problematic 
when using institutional holdings as a control variable (see Bhushan and O’Brien (1990)). Coupled with the 
fact that the inclusion of such explanatory variable forces the sample size to be reduced due to missing data 
on institutional holdings, we opt not to include it in our specification. Results are also robust to the 
inclusion of volume (turnover) as an explanatory variable.   12
coefficient on the post-FD dummy is positive and statistically significant, indicating an overall 
increase in the number of quarterly forecasts available after Reg FD is adopted. However, a more 
distinctive picture is available when we examine differential effects on groups of firms based on 
size. For this, we break down the post-FD dummy in specifications II and VI into different 
dummies according to the size group each firm belongs to. The results indicate that while big 
firms have increased their analyst following post-FD, mid and small firms suffered the opposite 
effect, having their analyst following decreased. The models in panel A of Table 2 have 
significant explanatory power: the R
2 is around 15 percent even after accounting for firms’ fixed 
effects characteristics.
20,21 
  All the results discussed above are from an unbalanced panel, so there is the question of 
whether survival issues could be playing a role in driving these results. It could be the case, for 
example, that small firms would be dying post-FD more often than big firms, forcing a decrease 
in analyst following over time. We argue that such issues are not likely to explain the differential 
effects we observe on firms grouped by size. First, the inclusion of size and performance proxies 
as control variables can account for a decrease in the analyst following due to a decrease over 
time in firm’s size and performance. Also, we repeat the same regression for a balanced panel in 
which only companies that have observations available for all 16 quarters under examination are 
included and the results are qualitatively the same.  
  Another concern regarding the results reported in panel A of Table 2  is that the models 
impose the same regression coefficients independently of the size group that the firm belongs to. 
Since specifications II and VI allow for different patterns of an explanatory variable – the post-
FD dummy – depending on the firm’s group, one might argue that we should allow for other 
                                                 
20 All the R
2’s reported for OLS panel data are within-groups R
2’s. The within R
2 is obtained from a 
regression using demeaned variables. Since we are mostly interested in the effect of the post-FD dummy, 
we avoid using the between or overall R
2’s because they are driven more by the explanatory power coming 
from the cross-sectional variation between firms. For example, the between R
2 for specification VI in Table 
2 is 0.60, but this is largely due to the high correlation between size and analyst following. Therefore, we 
use a more conservative measure of how the time-series variation in the control variables – including 
whether the observation is from the period before or after Reg FD is adopted – helps explain variation in 
analyst following. 
21 Notice that we report simple OLS results. There is, though, a concern regarding the characteristics of the 
dependent variables that proxy for analyst following: NOFOR can be considered a count variable and 
NOFOR_STD can be considered a censored variable. Alternatively, we ran panel data Poisson regressions 
when using NOFOR and the results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 2 (although there 
is also a concern that analyst following does not conform to all the requirement of a count variable in a 
Poisson context). For the censored nature of NOFOR_STD, first notice that this is a minor issue for the 
groups of big and mid-size firms, given that almost all observations have at least one analyst, and so in 
practice are not censored. Anyway, running a Tobit regression with panel data fixed effects does not affect 
the results reported here.    13
explanatory variables’ responses to vary as well with the firm’s group. To address this concern, 
we repeat the panel data fixed effects regression (1) separately for each group. The results 
reported in panel B indicate that the coefficients on the control variables indeed vary among the 
groups. However, the results regarding the effects of Reg FD on analyst following do not change 
qualitatively: each model keeps its high explanatory power and big firms experience an increase 
in analyst following at the expense of mid-sized and small firms, which have their following 
decreased post-FD. 
  To give a sense of the magnitude of the changes in analyst following post-FD, we can 
compare the coefficients on the post-FD dummy to the pre-FD mean analyst following. The 
comparison using the coefficients in specification VI of panel A of Table 2 and the pre-FD 
averages from Table 1 indicates that big firms on average experience an increase of about 7 
percent in quarterly analyst following; mid-size firms have an average decrease of 5 percent and 
small firms face an average decrease of 17 percent in the their analyst following. 
B.  Response of Firms’ Pre-Announcements to Reg FD 
In this section we examine whether firms changed the way they employ voluntary public 
disclosures after Reg FD. We focus on the firm’s use of public pre-announcements that refer to 
future annual earnings, quarterly earnings, or both, as our proxy for firms’ voluntary 
disclosures.
22  It is common that more than one pre-announcement is issued on a specific date 
(e.g., one for the upcoming quarterly earnings and another for the next annual earnings 
announcement). Firms make pre-announcements all during the quarter, sometimes together with 
earnings announcements. Finally, there are different types of pre-announcements, either of a 
quantitative (e.g. point or range estimate) or qualitative nature. These different characteristics 
have to be considered when defining the specific measure of the use of pre-announcements to 
adopt.  
  In adopting a definition of a measure of a firm’s propensity to voluntarily disclose 
information we want to discriminate among pre-announcements in terms of their relevance as 
instruments of information dissemination, and also based on the firm’s motivation for using pre-
announcements. This leads us to treat pre-announcements differently according to the date they 
are issued. For example, a pre-announcement issued on the last day of a quarter is likely to be 
more relevant (in terms of incremental information) than a pre-announcement issued 
                                                 
22 We collected data on pre-announcements from the CIG (Company Issued Guidelines) file in the First 
Call Historic Database. First Call emphasizes in the description of this file that “companies make earnings 
forecasts in press releases and interviews before they report the actual earnings”.   14
concomitantly with the release of the previous quarter’s earnings announcement. During an 
earnings announcement event, the volume of information produced – by the firm as part of a 
mandatory release, by security professionals, by the media etc. – is already high and is likely to 
contain, to some extent, information of a forward-looking nature, even when the firm does not 
mention it explicitly, for example, the next quarterly earnings number. And if the firm does 
include some specific information that can be classified as a pre-announcement in the First Call 
database, it is likely it will be at most of marginal importance given the volume of information 
that already comes with the mandatory release. Moreover, it is natural to think that at the end of 
the current quarter the firm has a much better picture regarding the upcoming earnings release 
than it does on the day of the previous quarter’s earnings announcement. Thus, we assume that 
the closer a pre-announcement is to the actual earnings announcement that it refers to, the more 
relevant it is likely to be.  
The approach we pursue is to examine the likelihood that a company, as of date τ , will 
voluntarily disclose information of a forward-looking nature – by means of using one or more 
pre-announcements - given the conditions holding at this date.  For example set τ  to 15 days 
before the end of the calendar quarter.  Since we are trying to examine the use of pre-
announcements that can convey useful information, it is important not to have τ  much before the 
end of the quarter. Around this period we can assume that managers have a good picture of what 
the upcoming earnings will be, so that a voluntary disclosure will be viewed with confidence by 
the market. On the other hand, having τ  ahead of the end of the quarter will result in a loss of data 
points, since as we go further ahead we will have firms already issuing their mandatory earnings 
announcements. 
  We include all pre-announcements, whether they refer to quarterly or annual earnings.  
Our examination focuses on the dissemination of information regarding the next earnings 
announcement release; since this information is a subset of the information that can be released 
regarding other future earnings announcements - for example, the next annual earnings number -, 
we interpret the release of a pre-announcement for a future annual number as containing 
information for the upcoming quarterly release.
23 For the same reason, we do not try to 
distinguish whether a pre-announcement is for the upcoming earnings release or for a future one.  
                                                 
23 Moreover, this choice turns out not to be restrictive based on how annual pre-announcements are used. In 
our sample, 55 percent of annual pre-announcements were released together with actual earnings 
announcements. An extra 14.9 percent of the pre-announcements described as referring to annual numbers 
were actually for the upcoming release that includes both annual and quarterly numbers, and therefore can 
be considered as well to be quarterly pre-announcements.  Another 16.3 percent were issued concomitant   15
Given that we do not try to explore the information content of pre-announcements, we 
also do not distinguish pre-announcements according to their nature, whether qualitative or 
quantitative. We are trying to identify if and when firms disclose information voluntarily to the 
market, without a precise characterization - from both theoretical and empirical standpoints – of 
the relative merits of qualitative or quantitative pre-announcements; the approach is to treat them 
equally. Therefore, we examine the propensity of a firm to voluntarily disclose information; we 
do not ask at this point about the quality of the information released when the firm does so. 
  Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics on the issuance of pre-announcement before 
and after Reg FD. Panel A includes the results for the complete sample. Overall, we observe a 
steep increase in the use of pre-announcements, from 5,582 before Reg FD to 12,162 after the 
regulation was adopted, and the fraction of firm-quarters with at least one pre-announcement 
doubled, from 14.9 percent to 30.6 percent.
24  Moreover, the increase after Reg FD in the number 
of pre-announcements issued and in the number of firms that used at least one pre-announcement 
is significant for all the subperiods of the analysis. If we consider only pre-announcements in the 
period that comprises the end of previous quarter up to date τ, the fraction of firms that voluntary 
discloses goes from 3.5 percent to 5.6 percent; for the pre-announcements released from τ up to 2 
days before the current quarter’s actual earnings release, the fraction of quarters in which firms 
voluntarily disclose jumps from 8.8 percent to 12.7 percent; finally, when we consider only pre-
announcements issued together with mandatory earnings release, this percentage increases even 
more, from 4.3 percent to 20.3 percent. Therefore, although the biggest increase in the issuance of 
voluntary disclosures occur for pre-announcements released together with mandatory earnings 
releases, the general pattern of increase is observed no matter how we define the relevance of a 
pre-announcement. In particular, the increase for the period between τ and the mandatory 
earnings announcement, which will be the focus of our multivariate analysis, is very significant.   
  A more interesting picture is presented in Panel B, where the summary statistics are 
broken down according to groups of firms based on size. Focusing on the pre-announcements not 
released with actual earnings announcements we observe that the increase in the use of pre-
                                                                                                                                                 
with another quarterly pre-announcement. From the remaining, sample, 3.8 percent were doubled pre-
announcements. Therefore, if we choose to analyze pre-announcements that are not doubled and are not 
issued with mandatory earnings announcement, the decision to drop from our sample the annual earnings 
announcement would amount to a removal of, in fact, only 10 percent of the initial sample of annual pre-
announcements. 
24 We also report in Table 3 the number of ‘doubled’ pre-announcements, i.e. pre-announcements that were 
issued in a day where another pre-announcement is also issued. Given that our focus is on instances where 
a firm voluntarily discloses, no matter whether it refers to one or more future earnings releases, we do not 
use the information whether a pre-announcement is doubled or not in any further analysis.   16
announcements after FD is confined to the big and mid-size firms. Regarding pre-announcements 
released between τ and the actual earnings releases, for big (mid-size) firms voluntary disclosure 
is present in 10.1 percent (9.6 percent) of firm-quarters pre-FD and in 18.1 percent (14.6 percent) 
of the firm-quarters post-FD, while if we restrict the analysis to pre-announcements before date τ, 
for big (mid-size) firms we observe voluntary disclosures in 6.4 percent (3.5 percent) of firm-
quarters pre-FD and in 12 percent (5 percent) of the firm-quarters post-FD. However, for small 
firms, the univariate analysis indicates a small, albeit not significant, decrease in the use of 
voluntary disclosures after Reg FD for either period in which pre-announcements are issued. If 
we consider all pre-announcements in the sample, independently of when they are issued along 
the quarter, the fraction of small firms voluntarily disclosing indeed increases significantly after 
Reg FD, but we can see that this result is misleading in that it is driven by an increase in the pre-
announcements that are issued together with mandatory earnings releases.  
  Figure 1 plots the quarterly fraction of companies (inside each group based on size) that 
issue pre-announcements. The picture reinforces the consistency of the different patterns, 
according to firm size, on how use of pre-announcements changes in relation to Reg FD. Before 
Reg FD, bigger firms indeed pre-announce more, but the differences in the average use of pre-
announcements among the size groups is not striking.  After Reg FD we observe a steep increase 
in the fraction of big and mid-size firms that issue pre-announcements, while small firms keep 
their average use of pre-announcement similar to the pre-FD numbers.  
  We now turn to multivariate analysis, with the objective of examining the determinants of 
the firm’s decision to issue pre-announcements. Our dependent variable is a dummy that, for each 
firm-quarter, is set to one whenever the firm issues one or more pre-announcements in the period 
from date τ until two days before the actual earnings release.
25  Our first step is to check the 
validity of the control variables to be used later when examining whether and how the use of pre-
announcements change with the adoption of  Reg FD. For this purpose, we run the following 
quarterly cross-sectional logistic regressions:  
                                                 
25 This defines a binary variable. We could instead use a model of multiple choices, e.g. measuring whether 
the firm issues only one or more than one pre-announcement during a certain period. However, the 
summary statistics on Table 3 indicate that (e.g., for pre-announcement issued between date τ and the actual 
earnings announcement) the fraction of firms with more than one pre-announcement is very small 
compared with the fraction of firms with at least one pre-announcement, and the evolution post-FD of these 
two fractions is very similar. This suggests that it would be very difficult to capture the effect on a decision 
to issue more than one pre-announcement when compared with the decision to issue only one. Based on 
this and on the fact that the econometric treatment of the panel data fixed effects logistic regression is much 
simpler when dealing solely with a binary dependent variable, we opt to use the binary decision only. 
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Prob[PREANNi,q=1] = f(a0+ a1 SIZEi,q+a2 NASDAQi,q +a3 SURPRISEi,q+a4 NEG_SURPRISEi,q+ 
a5 ABSCARi,q+a6 SIGNCARi,q +a7 PA_INDUSTRYi,q+Σ a8,n INDUSTRYi,q,n + εi,q )    (2) 
and 
Prob[PREANNi,q=1] = f(a0+ a1 SIZEi,q+a2 NASDAQi,q +a3 LOSSi,q+ 
+ a4 ABSCARi,q+a5 SIGNCARi,q +a6 PA_INDUSTRYi,q+Σ a7,n INDUSTRYi,q,n + εi,q )    (3) 
where 
PREANNi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when there is at least one pre-announcement 
issued by the firm from the period between 15 days before the 
end of the quarter q (date τ ) and 2 days before the actual release 
of that quarter’s earnings announcement  
SIZEi,q  =  Log of market value of the firm i at the end of the quarter q 
divided by the market index 
NASDAQi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when firm i is traded on NASDAQ 
LOSSi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the actual earnings are negative  
SURPRISEi,q  =  Absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings and 
the consensus mean forecast at date τ , scaled by the end of the 
quarter book equity per share  
NEG_SURPRISEi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the actual earnings is below the consensus 
forecast available at date τ  
ABSCARi,q  =  The  absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return for firm i 
along quarter, up to date τ  
SIGNCARi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the cumulative abnormal return for firm i 
along quarter q (up to date τ ) is negative 
PA_INDUSTRYi,q  =  Log of the number of the pre-announcements issued by firms in 
the same industry 10 days before the firm i’s pre-announces (or 
10 days before date τ if no pre-announcement is issued by firm i) 
INDUSTRYi,q,n  =  Industry dummy set to 1 if firm i belongs to industry n 
 
The explanatory variables are motivated by extant literature on the firm’s decision to 
disclose information. First, firm size seems to be an important determinant of a firm’s disclosure 
policy. King, Pownall and Waymire (1990) hypothesize that big firms have better disclosure 
policies because the incentives for private information acquisition are greater for them when   18
compared to small firms. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) present a model in which firms use 
disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and thus to decrease the cost of capital, and big firms 
disclose more information because they are the ones that benefit most from the mechanism. From 
the point of view of costs, Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that disclosure costs are more likely 
to decrease with size, so that, other things equal, the amount of disclosure should increase with 
firm size. Skinner (1994, 1997) suggests that litigation costs, which increase with firm size, 
would be especially important for bigger firms when deciding whether and when to disclose 
information.
26 From an empirical perspective, Lang and Lundholm (1993) provide evidence that 
size is positively correlated with analysts’ evaluations of the firm’s voluntary disclosure practices. 
More recently, a survey conducted by the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI (2001)) 
found responses that differ, based on size of the firm, as to whether firms are releasing more or 
less information after Reg FD: the fraction of firms that responded that less information is being 
provided post-FD is higher for the group of low-cap firms when compared to the group of mid- 
and high-cap firms.  
  The inclusion of SURPRISE and NEG_SURPRISE is motivated by research that posits 
voluntary disclosures as instruments used to align market expectations with the manager’s private 
information.
27  Skinner (1994) argues that firms tend to be more forceful in disclosing bad news 
than good news, first because of fear of lawsuits if a big negative surprise at the earnings 
announcement provokes a large decline in stock price, but also to maintain a good reputation with 
security professionals; to account for this possibility we include the LOSS control variable. 
PA_INDUSTRY allows for the possibility of an idiosyncratic effect taking place among firms in 
the same industry around the time the firm issues a pre-announcement. For example, some 
turmoil in an industry that leads some of firms to issue pre-announcements to correct market 
expectations might cause another firm in the same industry to pre-announce even when it does 
not have any news per se; it pre-announces simply to calm down the market. Finally, we include 




                                                 
26 The fact that small firms have fewer mandatory disclosure requirements mandated by FASB and SEC 
can be taken as indirect evidence that smaller firms face a bigger cost per unit of size to disclose. Empirical 
evidence on the differential marginal disclosure costs by firms of different sizes can be found in Bushee 
and Leuz (2003): they document that the regulatory change mandating firms on the OTC Bulletin Board to 
comply with disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had a negative effect 
specially for small firms, which could not cope with the significant disclosure costs and were essentially 
forced off the OTC Bulletin Board. These arguments relate to costs of mandatory disclosures, but a similar 
relation can be expected between size and costs of voluntary disclosures.  
27 See, for example, Ajinkya and Gift (1984) and Matsumoto (2002).   
28 Notice that some of the variables defined in the regression model above have a forward-looking nature. 
SURPRISE, NEG_SURPRISE and LOSS use in their definition the actual value of the earnings to be   19
The first regression specification uses only a subset of the data available on pre-
announcements. For a data point to be included in the regression it is necessary that a proxy for 
market expectations regarding future earnings releases can be obtained; using the analysts’ 
consensus forecast as a proxy for this expectation, our sample selection requires that at date τ  
there must be at least one valid earnings forecast available. In order to avoid the data restriction 
on market expectations, the second specification drops the explanatory variables based on market 
expectations and instead use only a dummy based on the actual earnings value to be released. 
Thus, all data points can be used in the second regression specification. 
  Results of regressions (2) and (3) are reported in Table 4 (results on dummies for industry 
membership are omitted). The coefficient on SURPRISE is significantly positive throughout the 
quarters, suggesting that managers use pre-announcements to correct market expectations and 
increase their use when the consensus forecast prevailing in the market is far away from the 
actual earnings to be released in the future. The coefficient on NEG_SURPRISE is also 
consistently positive and significant, indicating that managers’ motivation for use of pre-
announcements to correct expectations is amplified when the prevailing consensus is below the 
actual earnings. That firms like to avoid bad news is also suggested by the positive (although not 
always significant) coefficient on LOSS in Panel A: in the face of upcoming negative earnings 
numbers firms are more willing to release pre-announcements, thus bringing the consensus 
forecast closer to the actual earnings and reducing an expectations gap more likely to be negative.   
  There is limited evidence that firms trading on NASDAQ make less use of pre-
announcements: the coefficient on NASDAQ is negative for most of the quarters in panels A and 
B, but most of the times not significant. Regarding industry clustering, we observe that, except 
for the first quarter of the sample, the coefficient on PA_INDUSTRY is significantly positive in 
                                                                                                                                                 
announced in the future days. This definition is not troublesome if we assume that at date τ  the manager 
already has this knowledge (that’s why it is crucial to establish τ  at a point in time not much before the end 
of the quarter, when decisions about what and when to announce might be already done), because we are 
trying to model exactly the manager’s decision on whether to pre-announce. 
29 Other control variables could be included. As an example, Lang and Lundholm (1993) try to explain 
“better” disclosure firms (as proxied by analyst ratings of corporate disclosures) using performance 
variables (returns and forecast errors), structural variables (size, return variability and correlation between 
annual returns and earnings) and an offer variable (whether the firm is active in issuing securities). In our 
setup, we are not using performance variables (other than size) and the offer variable. However, our panel 
data specification mitigates the problems of not including these extra variables, because their effects can be 
considered firm fixed effects. According to Lang and Lundholm (1993), “structural variables measure firm 
characteristics that are widely known and likely to remain stable over time”, more so over the relatively 
short period of this study and in a similar way we can assume the classification of a firm as of an offer class 
is unlikely to change over this period.   20
both specifications. Finally, we observe that SIZE is very positively correlated with the use of 
pre-announcements, corroborating the univariate results seen in Table 3.  
  Both models have a good explanatory power. Panel A has quarterly pseudo R
2 on average 
around 17 percent and panel B has an average pseudo R
2 around 22 percent. The pseudo R
2 for 
the specification using surprise measures are consistently higher than the specification using all 
sample data, suggesting that using explanatory variables based on market consensus forecast 
prevailing prior to the issuance of pre-announcement adds a good deal in explaining the use of 
pre-announcements. 
  We now turn to the examination of the use of pre-announcements over time, in relation to 
the period Reg FD is adopted. Our univariate analysis indicated an overall increase in the use of 
pre-announcements by firms, but this increase seems to be confined to the big and mid-size firms. 
This pattern is also suggested by the estimates of SIZE coefficient in the cross-sectional 
regressions in Table 4. The estimated coefficient gets bigger and more significant as we go from 
the pre-FD to post-FD quarters, suggesting that firm’s size plays a more important role in 
explaining whether a firm issues pre-announcements during the period in which Reg FD is in 
place.  
  However, a more thorough investigation of the effects of Reg FD on the use of pre-
announcements requires a multivariate cross-sectional approach that also takes the time-series 
dimension into consideration. For this, we run a cross-sectional time-series (fixed effects) logistic 
regression. Similarly to the traditional panel data regression, the fixed effects logistic regression 
is equivalent to having one intercept for each firm.
30 The fixed effects logistic models are 
presented below. They are similar to the cross-sectional regression models, with the differences 
that we now include a dummy for post-FD quarters and we remove the dummies for NASDAQ 
and industry membership because these dummies do not change for each firm over time, so that 
their effects are incorporated into the firms’ fixed effect dummies.
31 
 
                                                 
30 Although in this case these intercepts are not estimated because, given the formulation of the logistic 
function, the conditional likelihood does not include the firms’ dummies. This is also important in that, by 
avoiding the inclusion of the firms’ dummies, the estimation procedure does not face the incidental 
parameters problem. For details on the fixed effects logistic regression, see Chamberlain (1980) and Greene 
(1997). 
31 Another way to explore this question is to collect all pre-announcements and include a control sample 
such that each pre-announcement has a corresponding control observation, e.g. matching the day of the pre-
announcement for a firm in a similar industry or with similar size etc. This is the approach taken by Soffer, 
Thiagarajan and Walther (1998). This alternative approach does not control directly for fixed effects, but 
rather through the inclusion of the control sample.   21
Prob[PREANNi,q=1] = f(aoi FIRMi+ a1 POSTFDi,q+a2 SIZEi,q+a3 SURPRISEi,q+ 
a4 NEG_SURPRISEi,q+ a5 ABSCARi,q+a6 SIGNCARi,q +a7 PA_INDUSTRYi,q + εi,q )  (4) 
and 
Prob[PREANNi,q=1] = f(aoi FIRMi+ a1 POSTFDi,q+ 
a2 SIZEi,q+a3 LOSSi,q+ a4 ABSCARi,q+a5 SIGNCARi,q +a6 PA_INDUSTRYi,q + εi,q )  (5) 
 
The results of the fixed effects logistic regressions are reported in Table 5.
32  In general, 
the sign and significance of the control variables in the fixed effects logistic regressions 
strengthen the results obtained in the cross-sectional regressions presented in Table 4. Even after 
controlling for companies’ fixed effects, pre-announcements are more frequently used by big 
firms, when there is a gap between market expectations and the manager’s private information, 
with upcoming bad news or when more firms in the same industry are also issuing more pre-
announcements. 
  Regarding the effects of Reg FD, we observe that in specifications I and IV of Table 5, 
that investigate post-FD effects for all companies as just one group, the coefficient on the post-FD 
dummy is significantly positive, confirming the univariate results we saw above of an overall 
increase in the use of pre-announcement by all the firms. A more detailed and interesting picture 
emerges from specifications II and V, though. When breaking up the post-FD dummy according 
to the size group the firm belongs to, only the coefficients identifying post-FD observations of big 
and mid-size firms are significantly positive: in other words, the increase in the use of pre-
announcements occurs for big and mid-size firms, but not for small firms.
33  
  In panel B of Table 5, we repeat the fixed effects logistic regression separately for each 
group, thus addressing the concern that the models reported in panel A impose the same 
regression coefficients for the control variables independently of the group the firm belongs to, 
even when we allow the post-FD dummy to vary among groups. The results reported in panel B 
indicate that the coefficients on the control variables indeed vary among the groups, but are 
                                                 
32 Notice that the number of observations of the fixed effects model is substantially reduced. This occurs 
because firms which have pre-announcements in all quarters in which they appear in the sample, or that do 
not have pre-announcements in any of these quarters, are dropped from the sample, since they do not 
contribute to the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. 
33 Specifications III and VI of Table 5 provide for an even higher pseudo R
2. However, we view these 
results with caution. The improvement of R
2 is obtained after the inclusion of PA_INDUSTRY, but since 
PA_INDUSTRY is likely to be affected by Reg FD effects, we prefer to focus on specifications II and V 
when analyzing Reg FD effects on the use of pre-announcements.   22
qualitatively similar to the results from the regressions using aggregated data. Most importantly, 
the results regarding the effects of Reg FD on the use of pre-announcements do not change.  
  To give a sense of the magnitude of the changes in the use of the voluntary disclosure we 
examine the odds ratio associated with the post-FD dummies in panel A of Table 5. For big firms, 
the odds ratio of the post-FD dummy is 1.97, that is, controlling for the explanatory variables 
discussed above, the big firms are twice as likely to voluntarily disclose information after Reg FD 
compared to the period before Reg FD; for mid-size firms, the effects are also substantial, with an 
odds ratio of 1.65; finally, the odds ratio of small firms is indistinguishable from 1, indicating no 
change in the likelihood of occurrence of voluntary disclosure associated with the adoption of the 
regulation. 
  In terms of an assessment of the overall use of pre-announcements by the market, our 
results indicating an increase in the use of pre-announcements by firms after Reg FD confirm the 
current literature by using a more stringent definition of the use of pre-announcements, more data 
both in the dimension of the number of firms and the time period, and a robust logistic regression 
that takes care of company fixed effects.
 34  More importantly, though, is that our analysis makes 
clear the cross-sectional differences in the behavior of firms regarding the use of pre-
announcements according to firm’s size. 
4.   Effects of the Reallocation 
A.  Forecast Errors 
News shocks at earnings announcement dates are a result of a gap between the 
information contained in the (mandatory) earnings announcement and the amount of information 
available about the firm prior to the earnings announcement.  That information could be privately 
produced or voluntarily released by the firm.
35  In this section we examine whether earnings 
announcement date surprises change in relation to Reg FD.  
                                                 
34 Straser (2002), Heflin et al. (2003) and Bailey et al. (2003), using different definitions of pre-
announcement and different statistical tests, all report increases in the use of pre-announcements after Reg 
FD.  Bailey et al. (2003) and Heflin et al (2003), for example, use as a measure of voluntary disclosures the 
total number of pre-announcements issued by the firm between two consecutive quarterly earnings 
announcement. Bailey et al. then make use of a univariate analysis based on matched pairs of pre-FD and 
post-FD quarters. Heflin et al. (2003) also uses logistic regression to explain the use of pre-announcements, 
although in their case, by summing up pre-announcements during the entire quarter, they are not able to use 
the current market consensus inside the quarter as an explanatory power, which as we see from Table 5 
adds much explanatory power to the regression. 
35 In a survey released by the Association of Information Management and Research in March 2001 (AIMR 
(2001)), 71 percent of the respondents reported that Reg FD had contributed to an increase in market   23
We first examine forecast errors at earnings announcement dates. We define the 
“unscaled forecast error” as the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings per 
share for firm i at quarter q and the consensus (mean) forecast as of two days before the actual 
earnings announcement day for firm i’s quarter q.
36   In order to get a comparable measure across 
firms, we define the “scaled forecast error” (henceforth simply “forecast error”) as the unscaled 
measure described above divided by firm i book equity per share computed at the end of quarter 
q.  
To examine the effects of Reg FD, we run the following panel data regression: 
EA_SURPRISEi,q= a0iFIRMi+a1 POSTFDi,q+a2 SIZEi,q+ 
a3 LOSSi,q+a4 ABSCARi,q+a5 SIGNCARi,q +εi,q          (6) 
where 
EA_SURPRISEi,q  =  Absolute value of the difference between actual earnings 
per share for firm i at quarter q and the consensus (mean) 
forecast as of 2 days before the actual earnings 
announcement day for firm i’s quarter q, divided by firm i 
book equity per share computed at the end of quarter q 
FIRMi  =  Dummy set to 1 for the i
th firm 
POSTFDi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the data point is observed after Reg 
FD was adopted 
SIZEi,q  =  Log of market value of the firm i at the end of the quarter q 
divided by the market index 
LOSSi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the actual earnings for firm i at 
quarter q are negative 
ABSCARi,q  =  Absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return for firm 
i along quarter q 
SIGNCARi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the cumulative abnormal return for 
firm i along quarter q is negative 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
volatility, with many blaming it on a reduction of earnings guidance (from firms), that is, on an increase in 
forecast errors at the earnings announcement. 
36 We repeat the tests described subsequently using an alternative definition of forecast error that takes the 
median forecast instead of the mean forecast as the consensus measure, and the results do not change 
qualitatively.   24
Besides the dummies that isolate effects of Reg FD, we include control variables. Given that firm 
size seems to be an important determinant of the quality of the firm’s information environment, 
the ability of analysts to forecast earnings could be related to SIZE. LOSS is included because 
there is evidence that forecast errors at earnings announcements differ between profits and losses 
(see Brown (2001)).  Finally, we include ABSCAR and SIGNCAR to analyze possible effects 
from contemporaneous firm’s return on the ability of analysts to predict upcoming earnings.  
  Table 6 presents results of the panel data regressions to explain scaled forecast error. If 
we scale forecast error by share price, the results indicate an overall increase in forecast error 
post-FD: the post-FD coefficients for the sample as a whole (specification I) as well as for each 
group of firms (specification II) is positive and highly significant. In fact, these results are 
distorted by the fact that the post-FD period is a period of market decline. The market decline 
induces a downward trend in the deflator measure used as the denominator in the definition of the 
scaled forecast error; therefore, even if the forecast error had not decreased post-FD, the scaled 
forecast error could still have increased due solely to the declining share price.
37 
  Our main interest is in assessing possible changes in the forecast error scaled by book 
equity per share.
38  These results are reported in specifications III and IV of panel A of Table 6. 
When all firms are examined together as just one group in specification III, the coefficient on the 
post-FD dummy is insignificant, i.e. there is no evidence of change in scaled forecast error 
measure after Reg FD is adopted. However, the break-up of the post-FD dummy - according to 
the size group each firm belongs to – provides evidence of movements in scaled forecast error 
that are negatively correlated with size: forecast error increases for small firms, decreases for big 
firms and reveals no significant change for mid-size firms. The result is robust to whether we also 
allow the coefficients on the other explanatory variables to vary according to the firm’s group, as 
evidenced by the results in panel B of Table 6. 
  Given the definition of forecast error, all the inferences seen so far apply to the sample of 
firm-quarters having at least one earnings forecast issued for the quarter.   However, taking the 
presence of forecasts as a proxy for the knowledge of the market regarding the upcoming 
numbers, it is reasonable to think that, for a firm-quarter with no forecasts available, the surprise 
– as a measure of how much news was really incorporated in the released number - at the 
                                                 
37 To examine further this issue, we simulate a distribution of each company’s unscaled forecast errors for 
the post-FD period based on the actual distribution of unscaled forecast errors pre-FD for that same 
company (i.e., by construction forecast errors do not change post-FD). Regressions on forecast error scaled 
by share price indicate an increase in forecast error post-FD (results not reported).  
38 We also examine effects of scaling forecast error by assets per share. The results do not change 
qualitatively.   25
earnings announcement can be even more substantial than that for a firm-quarter with some 
earnings forecasts available. Therefore, the results above support the view that for small firms, 
forecast error at earnings announcement increases after FD, but that does not necessarily implies 
that the average surprise at earnings announcement also increases. 
  In order to get more robust inferences regarding the information environment of firms 
before earnings announcements, we have to examine whether Reg FD is associated with any 
patterns based on the sample of firm-quarters without forecasts. For a firm-quarter with no 
earnings forecast available, we do not have a comparable measure of surprise at earnings 
announcements, and, therefore, we can not compare amongst firm-quarters without an available 
forecast.  A simple examination can be done, though, by looking at whether the sample of firm-
quarters without forecasts changed after Reg FD. For this, Figure 2 plots, for each group of firms, 
the quarterly fraction of firm-quarters that have analyst following (i.e. at least one forecast 
available about upcoming quarterly earnings).  
  The graph indicates that the groups of big and mid-size firms have a very large and 
constant fraction of observations with analyst following. However, for the group of small firms, 
the fraction of firms-quarters with analyst following seems to follow two different regimes in 
relation to Reg FD: before Reg FD around 65 percent of the quarterly observations have forecasts 
available, while after Reg FD this number runs close to 50 percent, and the difference on these 
averages is both significant and substantial. Given that the average number of forecasts increases 
with size, small firms are more likely to have their status, regarding whether there is at least some 
analyst following, changed as result of a change in the number of forecasts.  This is reflected in 
the figure: the deterioration in analyst following for small firms diagnosed in Section 3 
materializes also as a reduction in the number of firm-quarters being researched at least by one 
analyst, while the increase (decrease) in analyst following for big (mid-size) firms does not lead 
to a substantial change in the fraction of observations with at least one analyst following 
  Figure 2 corroborates inferences from the panel data regressions. For big and mid-size 
firms, regression results indicate no degradation in forecast error in relation to Reg FD (in fact, 
forecast errors decrease for the sample of big firms), while the figure suggests no change in the 
(small) fraction of observations with no forecast available after Reg FD was adopted; taken 
together, they suggest that the surprise component of earnings announcements does not change 
after Reg FD. But, after Reg FD small firms face both an increase in forecast error for the sample 
with analyst following and an increase in the number of observations with no forecast at all, 
leading to increases in the surprise news component at quarterly earnings announcements.   26
In conclusion, the multivariate analysis indicates no reliable evidence of an overall 
increase in forecast errors at quarterly earnings announcements, corroborating some results from 
other papers in the literature.
39  However, our panel data adds to the picture by revealing strong 
evidence of size as a cross-sectional determinant of the effect of Reg FD on surprises at earnings 
announcements.  While no deterioration is observed for big and mid-size firms, small firms were 
indeed affected by Reg FD.  Small firms lost analyst following after Reg FD was adopted, and for 
those still covered by analysts there are larger forecast errors. 
B.  Market Response to Earnings Announcements 
The market response to news shocks at earnings announcements is another dimension 
likely to be affected by changes in the way information about the firm is produced and released. 
In fact, one main argument of critics of Reg FD is that the regulation would cause an increase in 
volatility because information would not be released smoothly as when there is constant contact 
between the company and the analysts, but rather in lumps, e.g. if information is held up until the 
next mandatory earnings announcement. In this section we investigate this possibility by 
examining whether volatility at earning announcements changes in relation to Reg FD. 
Volatility at earnings announcement dates is computed as the cumulative absolute 
abnormal return over the window [-1,+1] around the earnings announcement day, where the 
abnormal return is obtained as the residual of a market model based on the value-weighted market 
index returns.
40 
  Figure 3 depicts the univariate behavior of volatility at earnings announcement, by 
plotting the quarterly average volatility for each group of firms.  In the cross-sectional dimension, 
we observe that volatility is correlated across groups. Since this volatility measure is idiosyncratic 
(by the definition of market model residuals), the pattern seen in the figure suggests the existence 
of a common factor in volatility across size (that is not part of the market model). When we 
compare volatility levels across groups, the small (mid-size) firms consistently have higher 
average volatility than the mid-size (big) firms do, which corroborates evidence in the literature 
that volatility is negatively correlated with size.
 41 
When we look at the time-series evolution of average volatility before and after Reg FD, 
there is a discernable pattern of decreasing volatility for three consecutive quarters right after Reg 
                                                 
39 Heflin et al. (2003) investigate pairs of pre-FD and post-FD quarter and also find evidence of no change 
in forecast error for the sample of firm-quarters that indeed have some analyst following. 
40 We use as an alternative simple excess returns, i.e. the residuals from a constant-mean-return model, and 
all the results are qualitatively the same.   27
FD was adopted (Q3:2000, represented by the horizontal line to the right of the figure, is the last 
quarter before Reg FD is adopted).  In addition, decreasing volatility can also be observed if one 
takes pairs of quarters separated by one year right around the adoption of the regulation (more 
specifically, Q1:2000 against Q1:2001, Q2:2000 against Q2:2002 or Q3:2000 against Q3:2001).
42  
However, when we extend the analysis to other quarters, post-FD, and to the quarters before Reg 
FD was proposed, the pattern of decreasing volatility after Reg FD is missing.  For example, in 
the last quarter before Reg FD was proposed, the average volatility for each group is higher than 
in the first quarter after Reg FD was adopted. To take into account seasonality in quarterly results, 
we can compare the volatility in Q2:1999 - two quarters before Reg FD was proposed - with 
Q2:2001 (or, for that matter, with all the three consecutive quarters right after Reg FD was 
adopted), and we see an increase in the volatility post-FD for all groups of firms.   
  To summarize, univariate analysis of average volatility across size and through time does 
not suggest any specific effect related to the adoption of Reg FD. Of course, univariate pictures 
do not control for changes in firms’ characteristics that are determinants of market responses to 
earnings announcements. Regarding market wide conditions, the use of residuals from a market 
model theoretically controls for possible changes in non-idiosyncratic determinants of volatility, 
although the correlation among groups’ average volatility through time suggests the presence of a 
systematic component of volatility not captured by firm size. To tackle these issues, we use 
multivariate panel data (cross-sectional time series) regressions to explain the market response at 
the time of earnings announcement as follows: 
VOLATi,q=a0iFIRMi+a1 POSTFDi,q+a2 SIZEi,q+a3 LOSSi,q+ 
a4 NEG_SURPRISEi,q+a5 SURPRISEi,q+a6 ABSCARi,q+a7 SIGNCARi,q + a8 VIXi,q+εi,q      (7) 
where 
VOLATi,q  =  Cumulative absolute abnormal return during the 3 days 
(window [-1,+1]) around the earnings announcement day, 
where the abnormal return is obtained as the residual from 
the market model 
FIRMi  =  Dummy set to 1 for the i
th firm 
POSTFDi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the data point is observed after Reg 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 For example, see Atiase (1980, 1985) and Freeman (1987). 
42 Bailey et al (2003) report results on these matched pairs without taking into consideration the separation 
of firms in groups based on size. Eleswarapu et al. (2003) analyzes effects of Reg FD based on comparison 
of Q4:1999 (pre-FD) and Q4:2000 (post-FD) quarters.   28
FD was adopted 
SIZEi,q  =  Log of market value of the firm i at the end of the quarter q 
divided by the market index 
LOSSi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the actual earnings for firm i at 
quarter q are negative 
NEG_SURPRISEi,q    Dummy set to 1 when the actual earnings is below the 
consensus forecast available two days before the earnings 
announcement 
SURPRISEi,q  =  Absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings 
and the consensus mean forecast 2 days before the earnings 
announcement, scaled by the end of the quarter book equity 
per share 
ABSCARi,q  =  Absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return for firm i 
along quarter q 
SIGNCARi,q  =  Dummy set to 1 when the cumulative abnormal return for 
firm i along quarter q is negative 
VIXi,q  =  Value of the VIX index at the earnings announcement day 
  
In the regression specification above, the dummy variable POSTFD allows for the 
examination of whether changes in volatility are related to Reg FD. The other control variables 
are motivated by an extensive literature related to volatility and returns at earnings announcement 
dates. As mentioned before, there is evidence in the literature that SIZE is correlated with 
volatility; besides, firm size can account for differences in risk that are not captured by the market 
model.
43 LOSS is included to allow for possible differences in market responses to negative 
earnings.
44  SURPRISE accounts for effects of news content of released earnings that goes 
beyond the consensus forecast, and NEG_SURPRISE tries to capture the asymmetric responses 
of returns to good and bad shocks.
45  ABSCAR tries to control for patterns of volatility that are 
contemporaneous to the earnings announcement period. SIGNCAR is included due to evidence 
that volatility tends to be higher in down markets.
46 
                                                 
43 See Fama and French (1992, 1993). 
44 Hayn (1995) hypothesizes that, because shareholders have a liquidation option, losses are not expected to 
be perpetual. Therefore, losses are less informative that profits about firm’s prospects. Hayn (1995) and 
Lipe, Bryant and Widener (1998) provide empirical evidence supporting this conjecture. 
45 For a review of the literature on the subject see Kothari (2001). 
46 See for example Christie (1982) and Wu (2001).    29
  Despite using an ‘idiosyncratic’ measure of volatility at earnings announcement dates 
(market model residuals), the correlation of the measure of volatility among groups of firms 
suggests that there might still be some general component of volatility that we are not capturing. 
This motivates incorporating the VIX index on the earnings announcement day as an explanatory 
variable in the regressions. VIX is an expected volatility index traded on the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange; it is calculated by taking a weighted average of the implied volatilities from 
eight calls and puts on the S&P 100 index.
47 By including it, we are investigating whether the 
market reaction to earnings news somehow relates to a proxy for the market expectations about 
future market volatility.  
  The results of running the panel data regressions to explain volatility at earnings 
announcements are presented in Table 7.  First take a look at panel A. Overall, controlling for 
firms’ fixed effects, the coefficients on the explanatory variables are in the predicted direction 
and, in general, are significant. Volatility decreases with firm size. In terms of information 
contained in the released earnings numbers, volatility increases with the surprise that comes with 
the earnings announcement and increases even more when the surprise is negative. The 
coefficient on LOSS is significantly negative, supporting the hypothesis in Hayn (1995) that 
losses are less informative than positive profits. The positive coefficient on ABSCAR confirms 
the contemporaneous relation between the market return and the pattern of cumulated returns 
along the quarter, and the positive coefficient on SIGNCAR supports the idea that volatility is 
higher in down markets.  
  The effects of Reg FD on volatility at earnings announcements are captured by the 
dummies for post-FD periods. In specifications I and III, in which all firms are treated as a single 
group, the coefficients on the post-FD dummy are significantly positive, indicating that there is an 
increase in the volatility at earnings announcements after Reg FD is adopted.  
  The VIX index does have explanatory power with respect to the market reaction to 
earnings announcements: the inclusion of the VIX index as a control is responsible for an 
increase in the R
2 of the regression from 3.5 percent to 5.4 percent. Moreover, after the inclusion 
of VIX, the effect of Reg FD as measured by the post-FD dummy is reduced by 75 percent, 
                                                 
47 There could be a concern, of course, as to whether the left-hand side variable, volatility, is used to define 
VIX (so that we would be ultimately regressing a variable on itself!). However, according to the CBOE, 
VIX is supposed to be a measure of “investors' expectations about future stock market volatility”, not of the 
current market volatility. Moreover, even if the expected future volatility is related to the current market 
volatility (e.g. if market volatility has a persistent component), the left-hand side is a measure of 
idiosyncratic volatility that is independent of market volatility. Thus, we interpret the VIX index as an 
appropriate control variable in regression (7).   30
suggesting that a big part of what might be interpreted as an effect of the regulation is in fact 
related to an increase in expectations about future volatility of the market.  
  Differential effects of Reg FD on firm groups based on size are analyzed by breaking up 
the post-FD dummy in specifications II and IV. Without the inclusion of the VIX index, the 
coefficients on all post-FD dummies are positive, indicating that market reaction to earnings 
announcement consistently increases across all the groups. However, after controlling for VIX in 
specification IV, only mid-size and small firms have significant post-FD dummies. Moreover, in 
panel B of Table 7 we report results from running regressions separately for each group, and they 
indicate that only the group of small firms has a significant coefficient on the post-FD dummy.
48 
C.  The Cost of Capital 
The results presented in Section 3 suggest that the adoption of Reg FD caused changes in the 
way information is produced for groups of firms based on size. Small firms did not increase their 
use of voluntary disclosures after Reg FD – in stark contrast to mid-sized and big firms, which 
substantially increased the use of these disclosures– and they also face a decrease in analyst 
following in the post-FD period. Taking the use of pre-announcements as a proxy for the quality 
and quantity of public release of information by firms, public release of information (channel (1)) 
by small firms has not improved after Reg FD.  Taking sell-side analyst activity as a proxy for 
information production by analysts, these results indicate that activity in channel (3) above has 
also worsened for small firms after Reg FD. If Reg FD shut down channel (2), and if informed 
trading (channel (4)) for small firms has not increased enough to compensate for the lower level 
of information production in other channels, then there would be an overall deterioration in the 
information environment for the group of small firms.  
For mid-size firms, results regarding their information environment are ambiguous. They 
increase the use of voluntary disclosures (channel (1)), but still face a decrease in analyst 
following after Reg FD (channel (3)). Finally, the information environment for big firms seems to 
unambiguously improve: big firms make more use of voluntary disclosures and face an increase 
in analyst following after Reg FD. 
                                                 
48 The evidence of an increase in the market response to earnings announcements – at least for small firms - 
contrasts with some other results in the Reg FD literature. Shane, Soderstrom and Yoon (2001), Heflin, 
Subramanyan and Zhang (2001), Eleswarapu, Thompson and Venkataraman (2002), Bailey, Li, Mao and 
Zhong (2003), find no significant evidence of increase, and sometimes evidence of a significance decrease, 
in market reactions to earnings announcements. However, none of these references investigate the 
possibility of cross-sectional differences on market reactions to earnings announcements based on firm 
size.    31
  Evidence of changes in the information environment of groups of firms is reinforced by 
the results in this section that some market variables behave as if less information is being 
produced about small firms. Forecast errors about earnings announcements, a proxy for overall 
market lack of knowledge about firms’ future prospects, seem to increase after Reg FD is 
adopted, and this is also reflected in a larger market response to earnings announcement news.  
On the other hand, forecast errors seem to decrease for big firms post-FD, and there is no 
significant change in the market response to earnings announcements. For mid-size firms, the 
ambiguity of what happens in the information environment is also translated in terms of market 
variable effects: while forecast error significant decreases post-FD, market response at earnings 
announcement seems to increase, although not significantly.  
  We now turn to the question of whether the changes in the information environment of 
small firms materialize as a risk factor, that is, whether they are priced in the cost of capital of 
those firms. The motivation for linking the quality of information environment to cost of capital 
comes from an extensive literature. In an asset pricing model developed in Easley and O’Hara 
(2003), linkage between a firm’s information environment and its cost of capital is caused by 
investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with more private than public information 
(and, in general, demand lower returns when more public and private information is produced). In 
particular, the authors argue that, as a recipe to reduce its cost of capital, firms can adapt their 
corporate disclosure policies, e.g. releasing more public information or attracting an active 
analyst following. 
  In another stream of this literature, improved disclosure might play a role in reducing 
information asymmetries among informed and uninformed investors, so that investors are more 
confident that the stock will be traded at a ‘fair price’, thus reducing liquidity risk (see, e.g., 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994)). Assuming liquidity risk as a 
sizable component of the firm’s cost of capital, improved disclosure can lead to a lower cost of 
capital.  More directly, Diamond (1985) argues that firms have incentives to make information 
available to shareholders in order to reduce the costs of private information acquisition, and Barry 
and Brown (1984) propose the existence of an “information risk” in that securities with less 
information available will be deemed riskier because investors will face more uncertainty 
regarding their future payoffs.  
From an empirical standpoint, there are many studies that investigate the relationship 
between disclosure of information and the firm’s cost of capital. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find 
evidence that increased levels of disclosure lowers the information asymmetry’s component of 
the cost of capital. Likewise, Botosan (1997) and Botosan and Plumlee (2000) find evidence that   32
increased disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital, and Sengupta (1998) provides 
evidence that firms with high disclosure quality ratings from financial analysts are rewarded with 
a lower cost of issuing debt. 
  To investigate whether and how the cost of capital of small firms relates to the adoption 
of Reg FD, we adopt the Fama-French three-factor framework.  Given that the evaluation of the 
cost of capital for individual firms can lead to very imprecise measures (see Fama and French 
(1997)), we opt to analyze the cost of capital for each portfolio based on firm size. 
  Table 8 presents the results of estimating Fama-French three-factor regressions for 
monthly returns on the value-weighted size-based portfolios during the period 1997:2002. 
Specification I reproduces the basic Fama-French regressions, while specifications II through IV 
include some additional variables in order to examine potential effects of Reg FD. A POSTFD 
dummy allows us to investigate shifts in the cost of capital unrelated to the three risk factors in 
the Fama-French model. Given that the portfolios are constructed based on the size characteristic, 
we also interact POSTFD with the SMB factor to investigate whether there are changes in cost of 
capital related specifically to the loading on SMB—the factor intended to capture firm size 
differences.
49  
  The results indicate no evidence of changes in cost of capital that are unrelated to the 
Fama-French risk factors: the coefficients on POSTFD are insignificant in all specifications. 
However, the coefficient on the interacted variable POSTFD_SMB shows changes in the cost of 
capital formation in the period post-FD. This coefficient is significantly positive for the portfolios 
of mid-sized and small firms, whether it is modeled together with POSTFD or not, while it is 
negative for the portfolio of big firms (although not significantly so).  
  The results suggest a significant increase in the loading of the SMB risk factor for the 
period in which Reg FD is operating: for the group of small (mid-size) firms the coefficients 
indicate that the SMB loading pre-FD is 0.46 (0.47), while the same loading post-FD is 1.18 
(0.96). Taking the three-factor model as a valid specification model for the riskiness of a portfolio 
and assuming the same pattern of the risk factors before and after Reg FD, the results here 
indicate a significant increase in the unconditional cost of capital for the portfolio of small and 
mid-size firms after Reg FD is adopted.  SMB is the difference between average return on 
                                                 
49 Fama and French (1993) showed that, beyond the CAPM market risk factor, two other factors are 
important in explaining the cross-sectional variation in equity returns: one is related to book-to-market 
(HML) and another is related to size (SMB). SMB (“Small Minus Big”) is the monthly difference between 
returns on small- and big-stock portfolios, thus is “meant to mimic the risk factor in returns related to size”   33
portfolios of small stocks and average return on portfolios on big stocks. Our POSTFD_SMB for 
small stocks is 0.71. Thus, the effect is 0.71 * (expected SMB). The average SMB over the 
sample is 0.16 (sixteen basis points), meaning that the effect would be 11 basis points per months, 
or 138 basis points per year. 
  A caveat to this inference is that these results might be driven by the way the portfolio of 
small firms is formed. In particular, in the Appendix we show that this portfolio has a small 
decrease in average market value through time, so it is reasonable to expect that the loadings on 
the size risk might change as well through time - although the magnitude of changes in risk 
loading does not seem to conform to the small changes in average market value of the portfolio. 
Instead of trying to correct the Fama-French regression for this change in size, we take a different 
approach to check the robustness of the results in Table 8. For this analysis, we repeat the Fama-
French three-factor regressions with the addition of the POSTFD_SMB variable for the 25 
portfolios formed on size and book-to-market from Fama and French (1993). Since these 
portfolios are also formed based on the size dimension, we are able to investigate the effects of 
Reg FD period on portfolios of small firms without depending on the details on how our 
portfolios were constructed. The results are reported in Table 9. 
  As a check on how well our size-based portfolios in reality proxy for Fama-French 
portfolios’ returns, we present in Panel C of Table 9 the correlation between monthly returns of 
our portfolios and monthly returns of Fama-French portfolios. The correlation between our 
portfolio of small firms and Fama-French small portfolios reaches 0.93 and decreases as Fama-
French portfolios increase in size. The results suggest that our portfolios represent well the Fama-
French portfolios across size. Similarly, the correlation between our portfolio of mid-size firms 
and the Fama-French portfolios peaks at the second and third quintile, and our portfolio of big 
firms indeed mirrors the Fama-French big portfolios.
50 
  Panel A of Table 9 reports the Fama-French regressions for the period between 1997 and 
2002, in which our portfolio of small firms is defined. We observe that the t-statistics for the 
POSTFD_SMB are positive for all portfolios in the first three size quintiles, above one for 14 out 
of 15 portfolios, significantly positive at the 5 percent  level in eight out of 15 portfolios, and 
significantly positive at the 5 percent for all portfolios in the second quintile. As a final 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Fama and French (1993, p. 9)). See Fama and French (1993) for a detailed description of these factors as 
well as how to construct them.  
50 Our portfolio of small firms very closely matches Fama-French portfolios at the fifth quintile. The 
average size of our portfolio through time is 0.66 million while the average size of the Fama-French fifth 
quintile is 0.69 million (although, as discussed in the Appendix, the Fama-French portfolio formation 
procedure allows firms to switch portfolios every month).   34
robustness check, we run the Fama-French regressions extending the pre-FD period to July 1963. 
Results reported in Panel B of Table 9 indicate that, even with this long specification, we still 
observe the POSTFD_SMB as significantly increasing post-FD for all portfolios in the second 
quintile. 
 5.  Understanding the Factors behind Reg FD Effects 
The cross-sectional differences reported so far are based on the size dimension.  The 
relationship is expected given that, as we argued before, size is an important determinant of a 
firm’s information environment.  In this section, we explore other firm characteristics besides 
firm size that might contribute to cross-sectional variation in the information environment pre- 
and post-Reg FD.  This analysis allows us to better understand how information is transmitted 
and incorporated into asset prices, and also serves as additional robustness test of the empirical 
methodology used throughout the paper. 
We first test whether our small-firm effect is related to the investor recognition 
hypothesis. There was a reallocation of analysts from small to large stocks and as a consequence 
many small stocks completely lost analyst coverage. We analyze whether the loss of investor 
recognition is the factor behind the increase in the cost of capital for small stocks. Second, we 
predict that the “complexity” of the information communicated by the firm leads to changes in 
outcomes before and after the rule change. The rationale for this prediction is that more complex 
information can be better communicated in private one-on-one meetings.  Third, we test whether 
firms with more severe management-shareholder agency problems are more affected by the 
policy change.  Possibly managers of firms with more severe agency problems are more likely to 
treat information as a commodity and selectively disclose it in exchange for private benefits. 
Finally, we investigate whether firms in “high litigation” industries experience the most 
deterioration in the information environment and, in particular, whether the small-firm effect is 
related to this litigation risk.  
A.  Investor Recognition Hypothesis 
Our results so far show that the rule change had a particularly adverse effect on small 
firms.  The analysis indicates that the loss of channel (2) – selective disclosure – was associated 
with a loss of analyst coverage (channel (3)), no significant increases in the amount of public 
voluntary disclosures (channel (1)), and a resulting increase in the cost of capital for small firms.  
In this subsection we explore whether the investor recognition hypothesis can explain our 
small-firm effect. Merton (1987) developed an asset pricing model in which investors are not   35
aware of the existence of some assets, and he showed that firms with a smaller investor base have 
lower values (and higher costs of capital). The investor recognition hypothesis has received 
substantial empirical support and has been extended in many directions.
51  
The passage of Reg FD was an exogenous shock that provoked a change in analyst 
coverage leading to a reallocation of analyst following from small to large stocks. Goshen and 
Parshomovsky (2001) argue that small firms may need selective disclosure of information to 
maintain and/or attract analyst following because the “cost of gathering and processing 
information to the market does not guarantee any individual analyst a sufficient return to justify 
the coverage…For small companies whose shares are traded with low liquidity the exclusivity 
generated by selective disclosure is analogous to that created by patent or copyright protection.  
In all cases, the loss associated with the grant of temporary exclusivity is presumably outweighed 
by the ensuing long-term benefits” (p. 1268). In this view, while large firms may respond well to 
the loss of selective disclosure, because the private gains to produce information are sufficient to 
compensate the costs, it may be difficult for small firms, without being able to enhance private 
gains by means of selective disclosure, to attract analyst coverage.
52 
As result of this reallocation, many small stocks lost analyst coverage, and thus are likely 
to also have lost recognition among investors. We test whether changes in the cost of capital of 
firms losing all analyst coverage are consistent with the predictions of the investor recognition 
hypothesis. Moreover, we hypothesize that the group of small firms with no analyst following 
pre-Reg FD should not be affected by the adoption of Reg FD because they did not have any 
analysts benefiting from selective disclosure to start with.  Thus, the subgroup of firms with no 
coverage is a control group against which to make comparisons.  This control group is also useful 
because it helps to separate the effect of the regulation from other concomitant and unrelated 
changes over the sample period.  
Thus, to empirically evaluate the hypothesis we divide our sample of small firms into 
further groups: those that had no analyst following before Reg FD and those that had at least one 
analyst covering before.  This division only makes sense for the group of small firms because a 
large majority of mid-size and big firms have analyst coverage (see Figure 2).  The results are 
reported in Table 10.  The results in the table show that there is no increase in the cost of capital 
                                                 
51 Empirical papers are numerous, including Kadlec and McConnell (1994), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), 
and more recently Kaniel et al. (2003).  Theoretical developments include Basak and Cuoco (1998) and 
Shapiro (2002).   36
for the group with no analyst coverage before Reg FD (the POSTFD_SMB dummy is not 
significantly different from zero).  The cost of capital increases significantly only when we look 
at the groups of small firms with some analyst coverage before the rule change. Notice that we 
break the sample of firms with some analyst covering before between those who completely lost 
coverage and those who lost coverage but not completely. This allows us to isolate a subgroup 
that had some coverage before and with very comparable sizes pre- and post-FD. The results 
indicate that the loading on the size factor increases for both subgroups (the POSTFD_SMB 
dummy is 0.58 and 0.77, both significant at 5 percent).
53  
B. Information Complexity 
Another firm characteristic that may exhibit differences in outcomes before and after the 
policy change is the “complexity” of the information communicated to the market by the firm.  
Other things equal, a more complex information environment surrounding a firm (e.g. firms with 
high intangibles, complex business models, or opaque growth opportunities) would lead to more 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors and, in general, to more 
uncertainty about the firm’s value. 
There are both empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that more complex 
information can be better communicated in private one-on-one meetings than publicly before a 
large audience.  Bushee et al. (2003) empirically find that firms with more complex information 
(as proxied for by the level of intangible assets) were more likely in the pre-FD period to use 
closed conference calls to disseminate information (i.e., calls that restrict access to invited 
professionals, typically buy- and sell-side analysts).  And, as mentioned in the Introduction, 
Aumann and Hart (2003) provide a theoretical demonstration that information can be better 
communicated by a long conversation than by a single message.  These results lead us to predict 
that firms with more complex information to transmit are more likely to be affected by the Reg 
FD policy change.   
                                                                                                                                                 
52 A related point is raised by King et al. (1990) who predict that disclosure increases with firm size 
because incentives for private information acquisition are greater as a result of higher profits to trading on 
private information. 
53 The way the subgroups are defined precludes us from analyzing effects on forecast error and volatility 
for some of the subgroups. For the first (second) subgroup, forecast error is not defined in any of the pre-
FD (post-FD) observations, therefore precluding us of running a panel data on forecast error and volatility 
(given that we need the consensus forecast as an important explanatory variable). In results not reported, 
the regressions results on forecast error and volatility for the third group, “all other small firms”, are similar 
to the results of running the regressions for all small firms. 
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We hypothesize the following changes in the outcome variables before and after the 
policy change for groups of firms with different complexity.  First, the change in analyst coverage 
is expected to be negatively related to measures of complexity.  This is so because without 
selective disclosure analysts will face additional burdens in gathering and interpreting complex 
information without as much ability to engage in valuable one-on-one communication with 
managers.
54  Second, the direction of the change in firms’ voluntary public disclosures is less 
clear.  On the one hand, the firm might want to disclose more information in order to resolve the 
asymmetries and uncertainty coming from its complex information environment--if this was 
happening pre-FD by direct contact between the firm and analysts, in order to compensate for the 
shut-down of this channel the firm would have to release more information publicly.  But on the 
other hand, public communication may be an imperfect substitute for private communication of 
complex information as both theory indicates (e.g., Aumann and Hart (2003)) and also empirical 
evidence. E.g., Bushee et al. (2003) argue that firms with complex information are likely to 
“…prefer closed calls to ensure that information is filtered through more sophisticated sources, 
such as financial analysts, reducing the potential for misinterpretation and excess volatility” (p. 
155); they have evidence indicating that volatility increases when firms open access to conference 
calls to the public.  Finally, changes in the other outcome variables are predicted to be positively 
related to complexity, to the extent that the substitution of private and public channels is 
imperfect.  That is, we predict higher forecast errors, volatility, and cost of capital for firms with 
more complex information that were unable to substitute the private for the public channel. 
  Having argued that a firm’s complexity works as a determinant of the change in firm’s 
behavior around Reg FD, we now empirically explore this possibility by taking complexity as 
another dimension, subordinate to firm’s size, when defining groups of firms. Firms are first 
sorted and divided into groups based on size; then each firm is classified into low or high 
complexity, relative to the median complexity inside the firm’s size group.
 55  The six resulting 
groups (big, mid-size and small firms combined with low and high complexity) are then 
examined using the same multivariate regression setups from Table 2 through Table 7.  
 Table  11 presents the results of the estimation taking the presence of intangible assets (as 
a fraction of the firm’s assets) as a proxy for complexity.
56 To save space, the estimates of the 
                                                 
54 Alternatively, though, private research could exploit that complexity increases information asymmetries 
and thus coverage could be more profitable and positively related to complexity. 
55 More details in the formation of the groups are in the Appendix.  
56 We also used low versus high book-to-market as a proxy for complexity. The results are qualitatively the 
same.  However, we decide to focus the results on intangibles as a proxy for complexity because book-to-
market is highly correlated with our first determinant of the partitioning of group, size.   38
other explanatory variables are omitted from the table.  First note that the results indicate that 
firms of the same size behave qualitatively as before, regardless of their complexity level: for 
example, big firms in both complexity subgroups enjoy an increase in analyst coverage and 
increase the use of pre-announcements; both subgroups of mid-size firms have analyst coverage 
decreased post-FD but increase the use of pre-announcements; and both subgroups of small firms 
have analyst coverage decreased post-FD and do not increase significantly the use of pre-
announcements.  
  However, within size groups, the differences in output variables among complexity 
groups are largely as predicted.  First, changes in analyst following are as predicted: the 
subgroups of firms with high intangibles tend to suffer a significantly larger loss of analyst 
following than the subgroup of firm with low intangibles and similar size (the difference is 
significant for mid-size and small firms, but not significant for big firms).  This difference is also 
economically significant (high-intangible and low-intangible small firms lost 21 percent and 11 
percent of analyst coverage, and high-intangible and low-intangible mid-size firms lost 9 percent 
and 5 percent, respectively).  Second, the changes in public voluntary disclosure are consistent 
with the view that the public channel is an imperfect substitute for private communications: there 
is no significant difference at the 5 percent level between the subgroups of high and low 
intangibles of same size with respect to the propensity to release pre-announcements.  Finally, the 
differences in changes in forecast error, volatility and cost of capital among high- and low-
intangibles are only significant for small firms: volatility increases significantly more for high-
intangibles than low-intangibles for small firms (p-value <.0001), and the cost of capital for high-
intangibles small firms seem to have increased by more than low-intangibles firms 
(POSTFD_SMB coefficients are respectively 0.75 (p-value 0.02) and 0.65 (p-value 0.05)). 
Overall the results are consistent with the view that more complex small firms were more 
adversely affected by the policy change than less complex firms. 
C. Governance 
One of the goals of the SEC when adopting Reg FD was to curb managers from treating 
material information as a commodity by selectively disclosing it to analysts in exchange for 
private gains (e.g., allocations in hot IPOs) or slanted analysis (SEC (2000), Lowenstein (2004)). 
We investigate in this section whether firms with more severe management-shareholder agency 
problems were particularly affected by Reg FD--because perhaps managers of these firms were 
using more selective disclosure in order to extract private benefits. The hypothesis we test is 
whether firms with more significant agency problems experienced bigger changes in their 
information environment and asset prices after Reg FD.    39
A widely held view in corporate finance is that agency problems are particularly severe 
when managers are entrenched and can resist hostile takeovers (Jensen and Ruback (1983), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). Corporate governance provisions such as antitakeover charter and 
bylaw clauses are commonly used mechanisms to entrench management,
57 and extensive 
empirical evidence links the use of these provisions with agency problems. For example, 
Borokhovich et al. (1997) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) find that firms adopting 
antitakeover provisions and firms newly covered by state takeover laws increase CEO 
compensation. Garvey and Hanka (1999) found that the adoption of such state antitakeover laws 
led to reductions in leverage, and several event studies (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) and 
Karpoff and Malatesta (1989)) indicate that antitakeover provisions reduce firm value. 
To evaluate the cross-sectional variation in agency costs, we use the corporate 
governance provisions in firms’ charters and bylaws and state takeover laws, as proxies for the 
degree of agency costs. The data on the corporate governance provisions for each individual firms 
is from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC),  and we follow the approach used in 
Gompers et al. (2003) to compute for each firm a governance index (G index).  We use all IRRC 
observations from 1993 to 2000 to compute the average G for each firm, and then use this 
average G to partition the sample of big firms according to their governance structures. Firms 
with good governance (democracies) are defined as the ones with average G in the lower quintile 
of the distribution, while firms with bad governance (dictatorships) are the ones in the upper 
quintile of the distribution.  Unfortunately, the partition based on G cannot be carried out for the 
group of mid-size and small firms, as G is defined primarily for big firms: while the fraction of 
big firms without G is only 15 percent, for mid-size and small firms this fraction jumps up to 65 
percent and 90 percent, respectively.  
Table 12 reports the results based on breaking up the sample into high and low G (again 
we only report the post-FD dummies for both groups). Analyst following exhibits a significantly 
higher increase in the good vs. the bad governance group. This result is consistent with the view 
that bad governance firms became less attractive to analysts relative to the good governance 
firms, because perhaps now they cannot be spoon fed anymore to the same extent. However, we 
find that there is no significant difference between the two groups in all other measures that we 
follow such as pre-announcement, forecast error, volatility, and cost of capital. In summary, the 
                                                 
57 Examples of antitakeover provisions are the prohibition of shareholder voting by written consent or 
calling of special meetings, classified board, supermajority requirements to approve mergers, and adoption 
of poison pills (see Daines and Klausner (2001) and Gompers et al. (2003)).    40
analysis suggests that overall the flow of information and asset prices did not change in any 
significantly different way between firms with good and bad governance.  
D.  Litigation Risk 
The risk of shareholders lawsuits is an important factor that firms take into account when 
deciding whether or not to disclose information and, if they choose to disclose, which channel to 
use.  The relationship between disclosure decisions and litigation risks is illustrated by Johnson et 
al. (2001) who find that after congress revised the federal securities law, enacting the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (this legislation was intended to reduce abusive class 
action securities lawsuits), firms increased the frequency of earnings and sales forecasts.  There 
is, however, no consensus in the literature as to whether disclosure deters or triggers litigation 
(see, e.g., Kasznik and Lev (1995)).  Voluntary disclosure of information, especially of material 
bad news, can potentially reduce expected litigation cost as shown by Skinner (1994). On the 
other hand, voluntary disclosure of information can also increase expected litigation costs by 
imposing a duty to update the information and increasing the risk of making selective disclosures 
of material information.  For example, Francis et al. (1994) find that firms that issued earnings 
warnings were actually more likely to be sued by shareholders.  
Our goal in this section is to investigate whether Reg FD has had any differential impact 
on the level of information produced by firms with ex-ante different exposures to litigation risk.  
In particular, we also want to understand whether the adverse impact on small firms is associated 
with litigation risks.  In light of the complex relationship between litigation costs and disclosure 
of information, there is no clear prediction about how the imposition of Reg FD affected firms 
facing different litigation risks. Public announcements may create higher legal liability costs than 
private communication because the latter is off-the-record, and it may be harder for shareholders 
to file lawsuits on the basis of a duty to update information. This view would suggest that less 
information would be produced by high litigation firms after Reg FD. The concern that legal 
liability could create a chilling effect under Reg FD influenced the SEC in the original drafting of 
the regulation.
58 But Frankel et al. (2003) find that after Reg FD there was a substantial increase 
in the number of firms adopting a “quiet period” in order to reduce the legal risks associated with 
selective disclosures, and this increase was particularly pronounced among firms with high 
                                                 
58 The SEC attempted to mitigate legal liability concerns by drafting the rule so that failure to make a 
public disclosure required by Reg FD: (1) is not a breach of the anti-fraud provision of Rule 10b-5 (so there 
is no private right of action for violations of Reg FD);  (2) has no effect on a company’s eligibility to use 
short-from registration under the Securities Act; (3) has no effect on whether a company is in compliance 
with the current public information requirements of Rule 144; and (4) does not result in a loss of the   41
litigation risks.
59 This evidence suggests that it is possible that high litigation risk firms were ex-
ante already more concerned about the risks of disseminating information privately--selective 
disclosure of material information can provide an additional motive for shareholders facing 
trading losses to file lawsuits.  This counterintuitive reasoning implies that high litigation firms 
were actually less impacted in terms of the amount of information that is produced than low 
litigation risk firms. 
Francis et al. (1994) find that biotechnology, computers, electronics, and retailing are the 
industries with a higher incidence of litigation.  Therefore, similarly to Frankel et al. (2003), we 
consider firms in these industries as having ex-ante higher litigation risk. Table 13 reports the 
results of the estimation taking litigation risk into account (again we just report variables related 
to the change post Reg FD).  The first key finding of the analysis is that litigation risk does not 
seem to explain why small firms were adversely impacted by the rule change; small firms in both 
high and low litigation risk categories seem to have been equally negatively affected.   
Interestingly, mid-size and big firms in the high litigation risk category seem to have increased 
their analyst following and increased the use of pre-announcements by more than firms of the 
same size and but in the low litigation risk category.  This evidence is not consistent with the 
view that Reg FD had a chilling effect on high litigation risk firms.  The evidence seems more 
consistent with the view that high litigation firms were less exposed to the change in legislation, 
presumably because they made less use of selective disclosure beforehand.  This puzzling finding 
is an interesting issue for future research to explore. 
5.  Robustness Checks and Other Issues 
In this section we briefly report on some results that take into account the onset of recession.  
Also, we summarize results on the use of conference calls by firms, another way to publicly 
disclose information. Finally, we report on the effects of Reg FD on American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs) and foreign common stock. 
                                                                                                                                                 
availability of the “safe harbor” protections under the Private Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The SEC 
enforces Reg FD through administrative actions. 
59 The term "quiet period" refers to the period that begins when a company files a registration statement 
with the SEC and lasts until the SEC's staff has declared the registration statement "effective." During this 
period, the federal securities laws limit what information a company and related parties can release to the 
public. There is no required quiet period before a company announces its quarterly or year-end financial 
results, but firms may voluntarily adopt such quiet periods.   42
A.  The 2001 Recession 
The post- Reg FD period coincides with the business cycle downturn in early 2001.  The 
business cycle downturn might play a role in the analyst coverage scenario. If a general recession 
also means recession in the sell-side industry, then the downturn in early 2001 could have caused 
the reduction in the supply of analysts. This could mean an overall reduction in the coverage of 
firms in the market.
60  However, what we see in the post-FD period is that only mid-size and 
small firms suffer this reduction in coverage, while big firms actually enjoy an increase in 
coverage. Even this pattern could be related to the business cycle if a reduced supply of analysts 
is consistently linked to a reshuffling of coverage between firms of different sizes.
61  To control 
for this we reran the multivariate regressions on analyst following including a recession dummy
62 
- for the quarters classified by NBER as recessions (2001:2 through 2001:4) - interacted with the 
post-FD dummies for each group (i.e. allowing for the computation of two post-FD coefficients 
for each group, one related to the recession quarters and another related to the non-recession 
quarters) and the results presented before do not change qualitatively. 
B.  Conference Calls 
Conference calls are another important method used by firms to voluntarily disclose 
information (alongside earnings pre-announcements which we analyzed before). Former SEC 
Chairman Arthur Levitt explicitly noted that closed conference calls (those where only invited 
investors have access) put the general public at a competitive disadvantage. However, advances 
in information technology now allow firms to “webcast” conference calls via the internet at low 
cost, disseminating the information promptly to all investors. Curbing the widespread use of 
                                                 
60 If this is the case, the recession effect is likely to be captured in a panel data design because the recession 
would also affect the explanatory variables. 
61This hypothesis is tested by Gorton and Madureira (2004). 
62 The period in which Reg FD operates also coincides with some other important exogenous shocks that 
might, as well, have influenced the market variables we examine in this paper, namely, the emergence of 
accounting scandals (starting with the Enron debacle in late 2001) and the attempts to regulate the security 
analysts (such as the National Association of Security Dealers and New York Stock Exchange new 
regulations on the security industry put into effect starting in the Summer of 2002 and the Global 
Settlement in May 2003). Regarding accounting scandals, the oversight of corporate governance issues by 
the media and regulators is likely to affect the way information is disseminated about a firm, both from the 
sell-side industry and from the firm standpoints, although it is not quite clear how the effects would be felt. 
Anyway, assuming that these effects would be felt starting in late 2001, the patterns of reshuffle in analyst 
coverage and changes in the use of pre-announcements would be robust to the presence (and effects) of the 
accounting scandals. The increasing oversight of the securities industry and the resulting legislation 
specifically aimed at it are also likely to be strong determinants of changes in the way the industry operates. 
However, if these changes were not anticipated well ahead in time, this does not seem to pose a problem to 
our research given that only our last two quarters coincides with the NASD and NYSE changes – and the 
results are robust to eliminating these two quarters.   43
closed conference calls and enhancing the use open-access conference calls were an important 
motivation behind the adoption of Reg FD.  
In order to have a more complete picture of how the information environment changed 
around Reg FD, it is also important to examine changes regarding the use of conference calls (see 
Bushee et al. (2003) for an in-depth analysis of this issue). Figure 4 shows a plot of the quarterly 
fraction of firms within each size group that use conference calls around earnings announcements. 
The figure displays a pattern of sharp increase in the use of conference calls, but there are no 
cross-sectional differences between groups based on size: big, mid-size and small firms all 
present a pattern of increasing the use of conference calls. More importantly, the increase seems 
to have no relation to the timing of the adoption of Reg FD; it starts well before the beginning of 
the discussion on Reg FD  - actually, starting in the beginning of our sample - and continues 
steadily through time. By the time Reg FD was proposed, around 70 percent of big firms were 
already using quarterly conference calls. While a multivariate regression would indicate a 
significant post-FD dummy for the use of conference calls, the pattern in Figure 4 does not lend 
much credibility to the view that this increase is related solely to the adoption of the regulation.  
C.  American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Foreign Common Stocks 
U.S. listed ADRs and foreign common stock (foreign private issuers) are exempted from 
Reg FD. These exempted firms have no compelling legal reason to change their behavior due to 
the new regulation, and thus might provide a natural control sample. However, as suggested in the 
SEC comments about Reg FD, foreign issuers were also expected to follow the practices of U.S. 
companies subject to the legislation because the SEC is seriously investigating extending the 
regulation to foreign issuers or simply because of herd behavior.
63 Moreover, companies 
incorporated outside US are also subject to their own home country legislation, and some 
countries already have regulations that mirror, to some extent, the goals of Reg FD - e.g. United 
Kingdom and Canada - making it difficult to isolate a sample of firms that are really free from the 
requirements of Reg FD. These considerations cast doubt on the idea that foreign private issuers 
constitute a good control sample.  
                                                 
63 Celanese AG, a company incorporated in Germany and trading at NYSE, illustrates the case. Although 
exempted from Reg FD, it professes on its web page that: “Fair Disclosure: The Board of Management and 
the Company's employees, as a matter of Company policy, are required to comply with all legal 
requirements concerning disclosure of information. This not only includes compliance with applicable 
German law, but also with various SEC and NYSE rules and regulations such as those concerning selective 
disclosure and insider trading.” (see http://www.celanese.com/ 
print/index/about_index/governance/governance_guideline/governance_guidelinedisclosure.htm). Herd 
behavior may be rational if the markets penalize companies not acting according to Reg FD requirements.    44
To evaluate the impact of Reg FD on U.S. listed ADRs and foreign common stocks, we 
repeat the regressions in Table 2 through Table 7 after adding two new groups: one for ADRs and 
another for foreign common stocks. The results (not reported here; available upon request) do not 
contribute to disentangling Reg FD effects from other possible intervening events. Overall, 
foreign firms and ADRs behave according to their size: foreign firms, which on average are big 
firms, increase analyst following and increase their use of pre-announcements post-FD, like big 
US firms. ADRs, which on average are smaller in size, resemble the behavior of small U.S. firms; 
they do not increase analyst following and the use of pre-announcements marginally decreases.  
6. Discussion 
Efficient securities markets depend on the flow of information. There are different 
channels through which information can be transmitted from firms to market participants.   
Regulation Fair Disclosure closed one of these channels (labeled channel (2) above): firms are no 
longer permitted to selectively disclose information to some market participants, but not others.  
For the information previously transmitted via this channel to still be transmitted in the post-Reg 
FD period, it must be transmitted by some other channel: by public disclosure (channel (1)); 
through information production and public release by sell-side analysts (channel (3)); or by 
private information production (channel (4)).  Our analysis has focused on whether the remaining 
three channels are sufficient to provide the same information post-Reg FD as pre-Reg FD. 
We found that small firms were adversely affected by Reg FD; their cost of capital rose. 
This finding is reminiscent of the "small-firm effect," which was first documented by Banz 
(1981) and Reinganum (1981). They found that risk-adjusted returns to stocks with relatively low 
equity capitalization were significantly positive, on average. This was viewed as an anomaly.  
But, subsequent to its discovery it has been reported to have largely disappeared; that is, the 
differential risk premium for small firms has been much smaller since 1982 than it was during the 
period 1926-1982. See Schwert (2003) for a review. Our finding of the return of a small firm 
effect suggests a reason for the original finding, namely, there was a lack of information, perhaps 
a certain kind of information about small firms. Schwert (2003) suggests that this information 
was subsequently forthcoming because investors responded to the academic studies. But that was 
prior to Reg FD. 
Our investigation allows us to say more about the information at the root of the “small 
firm effect.”  We can draw inferences about how the forms of communication outlined above 
differ by their costs, and hence by the complexity of the information that can be communicated. If 
there is no difference between what is communicated via channels (1) and (2), other than who is   45
told first, then under Reg FD firms would simply announce everything publicly that previously 
was communicated via selective disclosure. Otherwise, channels (3) and (4) could take over.  But, 
for small firms, this is not what happened. Some small firms just completely stopped being 
followed by analysts, and consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis, the cost of capital 
increased for those firms. Moreover, public communication does not seem to be a good substitute 
for private one-on-one communication, where there is a free give and take, especially for firm 
communicating complex information, consistent with ideas in Aumann and Hart (2003)—the 
increase in cost of capital was more pronounced for firms communicating complex information. 
Overall, our results suggest that Reg FD had unintended consequences and that “information” in 
financial markets may be more complicated than current finance theory admits. 
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Appendix: Data Description 
 
Data Sources and Data Requirements 
We use the First Call Historic Database to collect data on analyst following and forecasts, 
actual earnings announcements and pre-announcements. Data on prices, returns and shares 
outstanding come from the CRSP database and are complemented with some additional 
information on firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT.  
We study firm-quarter data points. Our sample consists of all firms on the NYSE and 
NASDAQ (common stocks; share code 10 or 11), ADRs (share code 30, 31 or 32) and foreign 
stocks (share code 12) that are in the CRSP database at any point between 1997 and 2003. For 
each of these firms, we collect all quarterly earnings announcement data from Q4:1997 to 
Q3:2002 that are in the pre-FD and post-FD subsamples as defined below.
64 We then complement 
our data with security returns and prices from CRSP and additional firm characteristics from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Reg FD was formally proposed by SEC on December 20, 1999, was approved on August 
10, 2000 and became effective on October 23, 2000. These are the relevant dates we use to 
establish our pre- and post-FD subsamples. A firm-quarter data point is considered post-FD when 
the observation refers to a quarter equal to or after Q4:2000 and whose earnings announcement 
day is after October 23, 2000, i.e. after the adoption of the rule.
65 
The definition of the pre-FD period is a more contentious one. Some studies have used 
the date of the adoption of the regulation as the milestone to define both post- and pre-FD 
periods. We opt instead to view the period between the date Reg FD was proposed and the date it 
was adopted as a transition period, in which it is especially difficult to predict the behavior of 
firms and markets in regard to the regulation. If the firms indeed changed their behavior as a 
result of the regulation, was it a sudden change that took place only after the final rule was in 
place, or was it a gradual one? Reg FD has attracted a lot of attention since it was proposed, and it 
is possible that firms would somehow prepare themselves for when the new rules would take 
                                                 
64 We use only the original reported earnings number, thus ignoring the presence of restated numbers.  
65 It is possible that for some of the observations classified as post-FD, the period in which the effects of 
Reg FD could be felt would in fact fall before the adoption of the rule. For example, if there is an 
observation with fiscal quarter at October 2000 and that releases its earnings on Nov 1, 2000, most of the 
period in which the production of information for that quarter would occur would fall before the limit date 
of October 23, 2000, but the observation would still be deemed as post-FD according to the classification 
procedure above. However, this does not seem to be a concern given that 87 percent of the firms in the 
Q4:2000 sample has fiscal calendar in December and that the median earnings announcement day for that 
quarter is January 31, 2001.   47
place. In other words, given that the adoption of the rule was a completely anticipated event, 
treating observations during the transition period as functioning under pre-FD status can be 
misleading. On the other hand, we can not assume that the effects of Reg FD can be observed in 
the transition period: firms could as well simply keep on functioning under pre-FD rules (e.g., 
providing selective disclosure) up to the effective date of the regulation. Thus, we decide to drop 
the transition period and instead define the pre-FD period as the one before the date Reg FD was 
proposed: a firm-quarter data point is considered pre-FD when the observation refers to a quarter 
equal or before Q3:1999 and whose earnings announcement day is before December 20, 1999. 
The post-FD sample contains data from 8 quarters, from Q4:2000 to Q3:2002. In order to 
use a pre-FD sample of comparable size, we define our pre-FD sample also with 8 quarters, from 
Q4:1997 to Q3:1999. Notice that by using 8-quarters subsamples, we guarantee that both 
subsamples have 2 of each calendar quarter (i.e. 2 first quarters, 2 second quarters etc). This can 
ameliorate effects of potential seasonal differences in measured variables across calendar and/or 
fiscal quarters.
66 
For a firm-quarter to be included in the sample, some conditions must hold. The usual 
availability restrictions apply regarding First Call, CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases. For 
example, when examining data on market returns we require that price and return data from 
CRSP be available for that firm-quarter. In particular, in order to use the market model to 
compute abnormal returns, we require that returns over the window [-200,-11] must also be 
available in CRSP.  
The measurement of some variables can be conditioned on the contents of available data. 
For example, forecast error at earnings announcement can be properly defined only when we 
have data available for (besides the actual earnings number) at least one analyst’s forecast for that 
quarter. Therefore, a legitimate firm-quarter observation - in terms of availability of data from 
CRSP, COMPUSTAT and First Call - can be deemed invalid to examine forecast error if the 
number of analysts posting forecasts for that quarter is zero. This firm-quarter observation will 
also be dropped from the sample if we use forecast error as a control variable to explain market 
response at earnings announcement. For this reason, sample sizes of different statistical tests will 
differ according to which specific variables these tests require. 
Regarding earnings announcements, besides data on the current quarter being analyzed, 
we require that data on earnings announcements for the previous quarter must also be available in 
First Call. Moreover, since we try to measure conditions holding at the interval between 
                                                 
66 For example, Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) report differences in market responses to bad news at 
earnings announcements when they are released in earlier quarters versus the firm’s fiscal fourth quarter.    48
consecutive earnings announcements, we drop from the sample observations in which this 
interval is smaller than 20 days. We also drop from the sample firm-quarters whose share price at 
the end of the quarter is below $1.  
Finally, to reduce the impact of outliers, all statistical tests that involve a variable that is 
subject to the presence of big outliers are preceded by a procedure to winsorize the variable. We 
winsorize data on earnings surprises and volatility.  
 
Subgroups Based on Firm Size 
As was discussed in the Introduction, in order to allow for the identification of cross-
sectional differences in the way Reg FD affected firms we analyze the effects of the regulation on 
groups that are defined based on firm’s size. Each firm is allocated to one of three groups based 
on its average size through the complete sample 1997-2002. The group of small firms is formed 
by firms with average size below the 50th percentile of the distribution; the group of mid-size 
firms is formed by firms with average size between the 50th and the 80th percentiles and the 
group of big firms is formed by firms in the upper quintile of the distribution. Then the statistical 
tests can be run taking into consideration these groups; for example, regressions can be run 
separately for each group, allowing the relationship between the variables we ought to explain 
and Reg FD to take a piecewise linear form.
 67,68 
Table 14 presents summary statistics on size for these 3 groups. Bigger firms are also 
older and more likely to belong to NYSE instead of NASDAQ, and Panel B indicates no clear 
industry clustering in the groups’ samples. One concern is that this method can lead to patterns in 
the evolution of average size of each group through time. Certainly each firm’s size fluctuates 
through time, but a general pattern of change in the size of firms can cause the average size of 
groups also to evolve through time; thus, some changes in market variables that are known to be 
correlated with size would be nothing more than adjustments to the changes through time in the 
average size of the components of each group. For example, if it is the case that small (big) firms 
are decreasing (increasing) in size in the post-FD period, due to the market crash of 2000, then 
                                                 
67 Notice that we do not reallocate a firm to a different group each quarter; instead, a firm is classified as 
belonging to one and only one group throughout the whole sample. This is essential for our research design 
based on panel data, since we will use group membership as a company characteristic and thus as criteria to 
break up the sample: if a firm were allowed to change groups through time, we would not be able to use the 
fixed effects control in the regression specification, given that the same firm would show up in two 
different groups.  
68 As a robustness check, we repeat the univariate tests in Section 2 with a time-varying definition of group 
membership, by which a firm is allocated to a (possibly) different group each quarter, according to the   49
the average size in the group of small (big) firms will be decreasing (increasing) through time, 
and a finding that analyst following for the group of big firms increase through time at the 
expense of the analyst following for the group of small firms would be a direct result of the way 
we partitioned our groups. Fortunately, the results in Table 14 suggest that the problem might not 
be severe: the average size of the components of each group seems stable through time, and the 
range of one standard deviation of size around the average measure suggests that the 
methodology does provide for good break points in firm size. More important, though, is that we 
still use firm size as a control variable when analyzing the evolution of market variables through 




                                                                                                                                                 
percentile of that firm’s size compared to the distribution of size among all firms on that quarter. The 
results (not reported) do not change qualitatively. 
69 That average size in the group of small (big) firms decreases (increases) through time can result simply 
from the sorting of the firms based on average size over the whole period: for example, a firm classified as 
small is more likely to have their size decreased -- than increased -- through time. As an alternative 
definition, we classify firms based on their average size pre-FD (except for firms entering the sample after 
Reg FD was adopted), and the results reported in this study to not change qualitatively.   50
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Analyst Following 
This table presents summary statistics on the measures of quarterly analyst following. Quarterly analyst following is proxied by two measures of number of forecasts 
outstanding for firm i in quarter q. Number of forecasts is measured as the number of analyst forecasts outstanding for firm i at the day the earnings for quarter q are 
announced; the standardized number of forecasts is a standardized measure of analyst following, computed as number of forecasts for firm i in quarter q divided by the 
total number of forecasts available for all firms in quarter q (the summation of number of forecasts across i and keeping q fixed). The standardized number of forecasts 
is presented in percentage terms, i.e. multiplied by 100. Details on the construction of subgroups of big, mid-size and small firms are described in the Appendix. 
Significance of change presents the p-values of two-tailed test of differences for mean (t-test) and median (Wilcoxon). The sample comprises observations in the periods 
Q4:1997-Q3:1999 (pre-FD sample) and Q4:2000-Q3:2002 (post-FD sample), except that observations with actual earnings announcements between 12/20/1999 and 
10/23/2000 are excluded.  
 
  Pane A: All observations                                Panel B: Subgroups based on firm size













































































































































Number of forecasts        
Mean 4.4544 4.772 <.0001 9.855 10.997 <.0001 3.9813 4.1066 0.0071 1.3951 1.0031 <.0001
Median 3 3 <.0001 9 10 <.0001 3 3 0.0612 1 0 <.0001
Standardized number of forecasts
Mean (x 100) 0.0247 0.0261 <.0001 0.055 0.060 <.0001 0.022 0.022 0.0981 0.008 0.005 <.0001
Median (x 100) 0.0162 0.0159 <.0001 0.049 0.055 <.0001 0.018 0.017 0.0782 0.005 0.000 <.0001
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Table 2. Panel Data Fixed Effects Regression to Explain Analyst Following 
This table presents results of panel data fixed effects regression to explain quarterly analyst following. The dependent variables that proxy for analyst following are 
NOFORi,q and NOFOR_STDi,q: NOFORi,q is the number of analyst forecasts outstanding for firm i  at the day the earnings for quarter q  are announced, while 
NOFOR_STDi,q is a standardized measure of analyst following, computed as NOFORi,q divided by of total number of forecasts available for all firms in quarter q (the 
summation of NOFORi,q. across i and keeping q fixed). The explanatory variables are defined as follows.  SIZEi,q is the log of market value of the firm at the last day of 
the month in which the earnings announcement is released, scaled by the market index. LOSSi,q is a dummy variable set to 1 when the actual earnings are negative. 
ABSCARi,q is the  absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return for firm i along quarter q. SIGNCARi,q is a dummy set to 1 when the cumulative abnormal return 
for quarter q is negative. The cumulative abnormal return for firm i during quarter q is the summation of market model’s residuals from 3 days after the previous 
quarter’s earnings announcement day up to 2 days before quarter q’s earnings announcement day. POSTFDi,q is a dummy set to 1 for a quarterly earnings release after 
the adoption of Reg FD, and 0 otherwise. POSTFD_Bigi,q,  POSTFD_Midi,q and POSTFD_Smalli,q are the interactions of POSTFDi,q with dummies identifying whether 
the firm belongs, respectively, to the portfolio of big, mid-size or small firms. Details on the construction of portfolios of big, mid-size and small firms are described in 
Appendix. The p-values are shown below each coefficient estimate. ). The sample comprises observations in the periods Q4:1997-Q3:1999 (pre-FD sample) and 
Q4:2000-Q3:2002 (post-FD sample), except that observations with actual earnings announcements between 12/20/1999 and 10/23/2000 are excluded.  
                                                     Panel A: Aggregating all data together                 Panel B: Running regressions in each group
            NOFOR       NOFOR_STD                   NOFOR_STD
          All Data             Balanced Panel           All Data             Balanced Panel Big Mid-size Small
I II III IV V VI VII VIII firms firms firms
POSTFD 0.1186 - 0.1669 - 3.72E-06 - 4.46E-06 - POSTFD 3.49E-05 -1.51E-05 -1.71E-05
<.0001 - <.0001 - <.0001 - 0.0007 - <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
POSTFD_Big - 0.8567 - 0.7555 - 4.09E-05 - 3.41E-05 SIZE 1.09E-04 8.99E-05 4.71E-05
- <.0001 - <.0001 - <.0001 - <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
POSTFD_Mid - -0.1868 - -0.2720 - -1.25E-05 - -1.82E-05 LOSS 8.00E-06 6.87E-06 -3.29E-06
- <.0001 - <.0001 - <.0001 - <.0001 0.0983 0.0024 0.0006
POSTFD_Small - -0.2346 - -0.2414 - -1.33E-05 - -1.49E-05 ABSCAR 4.39E-05 1.42E-05 -1.94E-06
- <.0001 - <.0001 - <.0001 - <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1457
SIZE 1.3693 1.3330 1.6233 1.6080 7.72E-05 7.55E-05 9.14E-05 9.06E-05 SIGNCAR 2.87E-05 1.94E-05 9.80E-06
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
LOSS 0.0512 0.0543 0.1042 0.1209 2.22E-06 2.39E-06 4.60E-06 5.47E-06
0.0370 0.0258 0.0232 0.0079 0.0975 0.0721 0.0649 0.0273 # Observations 16752 21237 25117
ABSCAR 0.1954 0.1893 0.4042 0.4005 8.47E-06 8.17E-06 1.79E-05 1.77E-05 R
2 0.133 0.201 0.216
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SIGNCAR 0.3465 0.3410 0.3746 0.3711 1.89E-05 1.87E-05 1.98E-05 1.97E-05
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
# Observations 63106 63106 27952 27952 63106 63106 27952 27952
R
2 0.131 0.145 0.138 0.153 0.139 0.150 0.143 0.156    58
Table 3.  Summary Statistics on the Use of Pre-Announcements before and After Reg FD per Period of Issuance 
This table presents summary statistics on the use of pre-announcements (PAs) before and after Reg FD per period of issuance. The first period comprises the interval 
between the second day after the previous quarter’s actual earnings announcement (EA) day and date τ, where τ is defined as 15 days before the end of the current 
quarter. The second period comprises the interval between date τ and 2 days before the current quarter’s earnings announcement day. The third period is the earnings 
announcement period, defined as the window [-1,+1] around the current quarter’s earnings announcement day. Details on the construction of subgroups of big, mid-size 
and small firms are described in the Appendix. Significance of change presents the p-value of two-tailed test of differences in proportions. The sample comprises 
observations in the periods Q4:1997-Q3:1999 and Q4:2000-Q3:2002, except that observations with actual earnings announcements between 12/20/1999 and 10/23/2000 
are excluded.  
  Panel A: All Observations                                Panel B: Subgroups Based on Firm Size













































































































































PAs in first period:        
(between previous quarter and τ)
Total of PAs 1187 1816 580 1068 381 555 226 193
Doubled PAs 406 736 212 432 131 243 63 61
Fraction with at least one PA 0.035 0.056 <.0001 0.064 0.120 <.0001 0.035 0.050 <.0001 0.016 0.016 0.9395
Fraction with more than one PA 0.002 0.003 <.0001 0.004 0.009 0.0001 0.001 0.002 0.0567 0.001 0.001 0.2513
PAs in second period:
(between τ and actual EA) 
Total of PAs 2990 4078 905 1572 1055 1619 1030 887
Doubled PAs 886 1451 317 633 303 543 266 275
Fraction with at least one PA 0.088 0.127 <.0001 0.101 0.181 <.0001 0.096 0.146 <.0001 0.075 0.073 0.5009
Fraction with more than one PA 0.003 0.005 0.0004 0.005 0.009 0.0019 0.004 0.006 0.0607 0.002 0.002 0.6456
PAs issued at the EA
(window [-1,+1] around EA)
Total of PAs 1405 6268 727 2979 421 2322 257 967
Doubled PAs 407 2645 238 1239 98 1004 71 402
Fraction with at least one PA 0.043 0.203 <.0001 0.083 0.358 <.0001 0.039 0.217 <.0001 0.019 0.082 <.0001
Fraction with more than one PA 0.001 0.001 0.0622 0.002 0.003 0.6843 0.001 0.001 0.1100 0.000 0.000 0.0330
All PAs in the quarter
Total of PAs 5582 12162 2212 5619 1857 4496 1513 2047
Doubled PAs 1699 4832 767 2304 532 1790 400 738
Fraction with at least one PA 0.149 0.306 <.0001 0.210 0.494 <.0001 0.156 0.335 <.0001 0.104 0.148 <.0001
Fraction with more than one PA 0.021 0.077 <.0001 0.042 0.154 <.0001 0.018 0.077 <.0001 0.009 0.024 <.0001
Total number of firm-quarters 32450 30656 8495 8257 10598 10639 13357 11760    59
 
Table 4.  Quarterly Cross-Sectional Regressions to Explain the Use of Pre-Announcements 
This table presents results of quarterly cross-sectional logit regression on the presence of a pre-
announcement. For each quarter, the dependent variable PREANNi,q is a dummy set to 1 when there is at 
least one pre-announcement issued by the firm from the period between 15 days before the end of the 
quarter q (henceforth referred as date τ ) and 2 days before the actual release of that quarter’s earnings 
announcement. SIZEi,q is the log of market value of the firm at the last day of the month in which the 
earnings announcement is released, scaled by the market index at the same day the market value is 
measured. NASDAQ,q is a dummy variable set to 1 when firm i is traded on NASDAQ. LOSSi,q is a 
dummy variable set to 1 when the actual earnings are negative. SURPRISEi,q is measured as the absolute 
value of the difference between the actual earnings and the consensus mean forecast at date τ , scaled by the 
end of the quarter book equity per share. NEG_SURPRISEi,q is a dummy variable set to 1 when the actual 
earnings is below the consensus forecast available at date τ . ABSCARi,q is the  absolute value of the 
cumulative abnormal return for firm i up to date τ . SIGNCARi,q is a dummy set to 1 when this cumulative 
abnormal return negative. The cumulative abnormal return for firm i up to date τ  is the summation of 
market model’s residuals from 3 days after the previous quarter’s earnings announcement day up to date τ . 
PA_INDUSTRYi,q is the log of the number of the pre-announcements issued by firms in the same industry 
as firm i in the 10 days before firm i’s pre-announcement (or 10 days before date τ , if firm i does not issue 
pre-announcement on that quarter). Industry dummies are also included (results not reported). The sample 
comprises observations in the periods Q4:1997-Q3:1999 and Q4:2000-Q3:2002, except that observations 
with actual earnings announcements between 12/20/1999 and 10/23/2000 are excluded. Panel A reports 
results using only observations that have at least one earnings forecast not older than 90 days available for 
quarter q at date τ . Panel B reports results using all observations from the original sample.  
 
                                                                   Panel A: Using all observations
             Quarters before Reg FD
1997:IV 1998:I 1998:II 1998:III 1998:IV 1999:I 1999:II 1999:III
Intercept -5.0429 -5.9778 -5.5561 -5.0242 -3.4273 -4.3398 -4.3055 -4.9926
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SIZE 0.224 0.2021 0.1751 0.179 0.0617 0.1182 0.0923 0.0976
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0768 0.0011 0.0143 0.0096
NASDAQ 0.1152 -0.1453 0.1897 -0.4504 -0.1526 -0.171 -0.364 -0.2843
0.5197 0.4167 0.22 0.0016 0.2658 0.2407 0.019 0.0604
LOSS 0.1823 0.5323 0.2229 0.3595 0.0208 0.157 0.4037 0.3397
0.3585 0.0036 0.1676 0.0162 0.8836 0.2869 0.0104 0.0292
ABSCAR 1.1203 1.949 1.4877 1.863 0.4312 1.0833 -0.1869 1.0876
0.0188 0.0001 0.0007 <.0001 0.0365 0.0002 0.6748 0.0039
SIGNCAR -0.0574 0.4767 0.5569 0.2428 0.3044 0.4108 0.00952 0.5371
0.7156 0.0005 0.0002 0.09 0.0053 0.001 0.9383 <.0001
PA_INDUSTRY -0.6197 1.3718 1.5057 2.2626 0.2468 1.2674 1.5539 2.5121
0.0039 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0792 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
# Observations 3629 3946 4151 4113 4108 4174 4197 4133
Pseudo R
2 0.096 0.162 0.134 0.231 0.062 0.139 0.157 0.250
             Quarters After Reg FD
2000:IV 2001:I 2001:II 2001:III 2001:IV 2002:I 2002:II 2002:III
Intercept -3.4488 -4.483 -6.2335 -5.585 -3.5969 -5.7136 -3.9785 -5.0062
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SIZE 0.1234 0.2401 0.3066 0.2694 0.2008 0.2831 0.197 0.2447
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
NASDAQ -0.2945 0.0269 0.0861 -0.3633 -0.0846 0.1032 -0.0493 -0.0724
0.0164 0.8314 0.5331 0.0123 0.5403 0.4921 0.7368 0.5986
LOSS 0.1536 0.1367 0.2302 -0.0934 -0.0429 -0.0766 0.241 -0.1861
0.2031 0.2596 0.0869 0.5045 0.7411 0.6019 0.1096 0.2198
ABSCAR 0.1852 0.8795 0.9833 0.7413 0.2606 1.2579 1.0689 0.5879
0.5107 0.001 0.0042 0.0837 0.4429 0.0039 0.0075 0.1507
SIGNCAR 0.247 0.1349 0.197 0.1834 0.3097 0.1729 0.2596 0.0903
0.0168 0.194 0.0699 0.1071 0.0055 0.1514 0.0278 0.4199
PA_INDUSTRY 1.1723 0.5282 1.5776 2.4992 -0.5299 1.0238 0.4983 1.2421
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0011 <.0001
# Observations 4101 4054 4075 3905 3834 3704 3562 3420
Pseudo R
2 0.136 0.153 0.200 0.420 0.110 0.198 0.141 0.190  
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                                        Panel B: Using only observations for which consensus forecast is available
             Quarters before Reg FD
1997:IV 1998:I 1998:II 1998:III 1998:IV 1999:I 1999:II 1999:III
Intercept -4.6114 -5.1828 -5.3378 -4.5855 -3.0135 -3.9201 -4.0907 -5.6953
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SIZE 0.1907 0.1552 0.1481 0.1312 0.0427 0.0782 0.08 0.1243
0.0005 0.0061 0.0022 0.0034 0.3089 0.0737 0.0802 0.0071
NASDAQ 0.2257 -0.1524 0.2283 -0.3973 -0.1176 -0.1427 -0.3625 -0.3819
0.248 0.4474 0.1872 0.012 0.4409 0.3828 0.0414 0.0299
NEG_SURPRISE 0.9202 1.2438 1.3479 1.0639 0.9835 0.9606 1.402 1.1773
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SURPRISE 19.1174 25.1405 26.2663 26.8845 14.3069 20.2016 20.1124 36.8681
0.0011 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.007 0.0004 0.0001 <.0001
ABSCAR 0.5966 2.2315 0.6247 1.1439 0.1489 0.6426 -0.1982 1.4682
0.2823 0.0012 0.2325 0.0041 0.7169 0.0918 0.7154 0.0031
SIGNCAR -0.1544 0.4525 0.2547 -0.0827 0.2498 0.2766 -0.0226 0.5143
0.3787 0.0041 0.1368 0.6026 0.0476 0.0583 0.8735 0.0007
PA_INDUSTRY -0.79 1.3398 0.8974 2.0965 -0.0566 1.0455 1.5517 2.388
0.0008 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7159 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
# Observations 2535 2650 2801 2811 2784 2780 2847 2793
Pseudo R
2 0.138 0.233 0.206 0.283 0.110 0.172 0.250 0.330
             Quarters After Reg FD
2000:IV 2001:I 2001:II 2001:III 2001:IV 2002:I 2002:II 2002:III
Intercept -3.2888 -4.7031 -6.2854 -5.1042 -2.8957 -5.4728 -4.1258 -5.2652
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SIZE 0.0541 0.2 0.2486 0.1381 0.1522 0.2457 0.1584 0.2116
0.1342 <.0001 <.0001 0.0007 <.0001 <.0001 0.0004 <.0001
NASDAQ -0.2674 0.1042 0.2417 -0.2834 -0.0997 0.0504 -0.1377 -0.0905
0.056 0.4614 0.1203 0.075 0.5031 0.757 0.3917 0.5487
NEG_SURPRISE 0.9422 1.2833 1.4494 1.0336 0.6565 0.7717 0.971 0.912
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SURPRISE 14.1542 20.717 18.7542 18.0542 18.7575 31.2891 26.725 24.1087
0.0042 <.0001 0.0005 0.0075 0.0012 <.0001 <.0001 0.0012
ABSCAR 0.2138 0.4365 0.4643 -0.018 -0.0569 0.4871 0.9418 0.1339
0.5355 0.1829 0.2519 0.9721 0.8877 0.3387 0.0376 0.7664
SIGNCAR 0.1345 0.0754 0.1287 -0.0645 0.3569 0.0643 0.1266 -0.0146
0.2642 0.5262 0.2953 0.6148 0.0037 0.6298 0.3387 0.9051
PA_INDUSTRY 0.2138 0.4365 0.4643 -0.018 -0.0569 0.4871 0.9418 0.1339
0.5355 0.1829 0.2519 0.9721 0.8877 0.3387 0.0376 0.7664
# Observations 2637 2666 2685 2647 2663 2583 2594 2496
Pseudo R
2 0.183 0.208 0.271 0.454 0.126 0.228 0.188 0.209  
   61
Table 5. Panel Data Regression (Conditional Logit) to Explain the Use of Pre-announcements 
This table presents results of conditional (fixed effects) logit regressions of the presence of a pre-announcement. The dependent variable PREANNi,q is a dummy set to 1 
when there is at least one pre-announcement issued by the firm from the period between 15 days before the end of the quarter q (henceforth referred as date τ ) and 2 
days before the actual release of that quarter’s earnings announcement. SIZEi,q is the log of market value of the firm at the last day of the month in which the earnings 
announcement is released, scaled by the market index at the same day the market value is measured. LOSSi,q is a dummy variable set to 1 when the actual earnings are 
negative. The variable SURPRISEi,q is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings and the consensus mean forecast at date τ , scaled by 
the end of the quarter book equity per share. NEG_SURPRISEi,q is a dummy variable set to 1 when the actual earnings is below the consensus forecast available at date 
τ . ABSCARi,q is the  absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return for firm i up to date τ . SIGNCARi,q is a dummy set to 1 when this cumulative abnormal return 
negative. The cumulative abnormal return for firm i up to date τ  is the summation of market model’s residuals from 3 days after the previous quarter’s earnings 
announcement day up to date τ . PA_INDUSTRYi,q is the log of the number of the pre-announcements issued by firms in the same industry as firm i between date τ  and 
the day of firm i’s pre-announcement (or the actual earnings announcement, if firm i  does not issue pre-announcement on that quarter). POSTFD_Bigi,q,  
POSTFD_Midi,q and POSTFD_Smalli,q are the interactions of POSTFDi,q with dummies identifying whether the firm belongs, respectively, to the portfolio of big, mid-
size or small firms. Details on the construction of portfolios of big, mid-size and small firms are described in the Appendix. The p-values are shown below each 
coefficient estimate. The sample comprises observations in the periods Q4:1997-Q3:1999 (pre-FD sample) and Q4:2000-Q3:2002 (post-FD sample), except that 
observations with actual earnings announcements between 12/20/1999 and 10/23/2000 are excluded. The first 2 columns of Panel A report results using all observations 
from the original sample, and the last 2 columns report results using only observations that have at least one earnings forecast not older than 90 days available for 
quarter q at date τ .  
                            Panel A: Aggregating all data together                 Panel B: Running regressions in each group
Big Mid-size Small
I II III IV V VI firms firms firms
POSTFD 0.5226 - - 0.5664 - - POSTFD 0.7697 0.5874 0.1572
<.0001 - - <.0001 - - <.0001 <.0001 0.0800
POSTFD_Big - 0.7582 0.4927 - 0.7548 0.5067 SIZE -0.0022 0.1449 0.2764
- <.0001 <.0001 - <.0001 <.0001 0.9710 0.0030 <.0001
POSTFD_Mid - 0.6057 0.3778 - 0.5890 0.3764 NEG_SURPRISE 1.2030 1.4544 1.3010
- <.0001 <.0001 - <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
POSTFD_Small - 0.0561 -0.1906 - 0.1260 -0.0785 SURPRISE 34.0600 7.8479 4.4843
- 0.3780 0.0040 - 0.1500 0.3260 <.0001 <.0001 0.2760
SIZE 0.0989 0.0723 0.1047 0.1598 0.1412 0.1644 ABSCAR 0.2168 0.7414 0.3881
0.0010 0.0150 0.0010 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3740 <.0001 0.0350
LOSS 0.4012 0.4012 0.4288 - - - SIGNCAR 0.1586 0.1499 0.1605
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 - - - 0.0040 0.0060 0.0170
NEG_SURPRISE - - - 1.3556 1.3500 1.3290
- - - <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 # Observations 11703 12135 7327
SURPRISE - - - 6.5455 6.6500 6.1776 Pseudo R
2 0.100 0.117 0.857
- - - <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
ABSCAR 0.6745 0.6835 0.5229 0.5209 0.5246 0.3565
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SIGNCAR 0.2603 0.2618 0.1968 0.1595 0.1605 0.1007
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
PA_INDUSTRY - - 0.8973 - - 0.8371
- - <.0001 - - <.0001
# Observations 34799 34799 34799 31155 31155 31155
Pseudo R
2 0.019 0.023 0.069 0.098 0.100 0.139    62
Table 6.  Panel Data Fixed Effects Regression to Explain Forecast Error 
This table presents results of panel data fixed effects regression to explain forecast error at quarterly earnings announcements. The dependent variable, 
EA_SURPRISEi,q, is the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings per share for firm i at quarter q and the consensus (mean) forecast as of 2 days before 
the actual earnings announcement day for firm i’s quarter q, divided by either firm i market value of equity at the end of the quarter (specifications I and II) or  firm i 
book equity per share computed at the end of quarter q (specifications III and IV). The explanatory variables are defined as follows.  SIZEi,q is the log of market value of 
the firm at the last day of the month in which the earnings announcement is released, scaled by the market index. LOSSi,q is a dummy variable set to 1 when the actual 
earnings are negative. ABSCARi,q is the  absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return for firm i along quarter q. SIGNCARi,q is a dummy set to 1 when the 
cumulative abnormal return for quarter q is negative. The cumulative abnormal return for firm i during quarter q is the summation of market model’s residuals from 3 
days after the previous quarter’s earnings announcement day up to 2 days before quarter q’s earnings announcement day. POSTFDi,q is a dummy set to 1 for a quarterly 
earnings release after the adoption of Reg FD, and 0 otherwise. POSTFD_Bigi,q,  POSTFD_Midi,q and POSTFD_Smalli,q are the interactions of POSTFDi,q with 
dummies identifying whether the firm belongs, respectively, to the portfolio of big, mid-size or small firms. Details on the construction of portfolios of big, mid-size and 
small firms are described in The Appendix. The p-values are shown below each coefficient estimate. The sample comprises observations in the periods Q4:1997-
Q3:1999 (pre-FD sample) and Q4:2000-Q3:2002 (post-FD sample), except that observations with actual earnings announcements between 12/20/1999 and 10/23/2000 
are excluded.  
                            Panel A: Aggregating all data together             Panel B: Running regressions in each group
     Earning surprise scaled      Earning surprise scaled
         by share price    by book equity per share        Earning surprise scaled by book equity per share
Big Mid-size Small
I II III IV firms firms firms
POSTFD 0.0019 - -0.0001 - POSTFD -0.0004 0.0000 0.0006
<.0001 - 0.4223 - 0.0011 0.8936 0.0258
POSTFD_Big - 0.0006 - -0.0002 SIZE -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0007
- <.0001 - 0.0387 <.0001 <.0001 0.0013
POSTFD_Mid - 0.0019 - -0.0001 LOSS 0.0020 0.0041 0.0069
- <.0001 - 0.5107 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
POSTFD_Small - 0.0031 - 0.0008 ABSCAR 0.0012 0.0022 0.0016
- <.0001 - <.0001 0.0007 <.0001 0.0007
SIZE -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0010 -0.0010 SIGNCAR -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0006
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0029
LOSS 0.0048 0.0048 0.0046 0.0045
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 # Observations 15786 17942 11987
ABSCAR 0.0014 0.0014 0.0018 0.0018 R
2 0.011 0.031 0.044
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SIGNCAR 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005
<.0001 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001
# Observations 45715 45715 45715 45715
R
2 0.138 0.137 0.029 0.029     63
Table 7.  Panel Data Fixed Effects Regression to Explain Volatility (Market Response) at Earnings Announcements 
This table presents results of panel data fixed effects regression to explain volatility (market response) at earnings announcements. The dependent variable, volatility, is 
defined as the cumulative absolute abnormal return during the 3 days (window [-1,+1]) around the earnings announcement day, where the abnormal return is obtained as 
the residual from the market model. The explanatory variables are defined as follows.  SIZEi,q is the log of market value of the firm at the last day of the month in which 
the earnings announcement is released, scaled by the market index. LOSSi,q is a dummy variable set to 1 when the actual earnings are negative. SURPRISEi,q is 
measured as the absolute value of the difference between the actual earnings and the consensus mean forecast two days before the earnings announcement, scaled by the 
end of the quarter book equity per share. NEG_SURPRISEi,q is a dummy variable set to 1 when the actual earnings is below the consensus forecast. ABSCARi,q is the  
absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return for firm i along quarter q. SIGNCARi,q is a dummy set to 1 when the cumulative abnormal return for quarter q is 
negative. The cumulative abnormal return for firm i during quarter q is the summation of market model’s residuals from 3 days after the previous quarter’s earnings 
announcement day up to 2 days before quarter q’s earnings announcement day. VIX is the value of the volatility index for the Chicago Board Options Exchange at the 
earnings announcement day. POSTFDi,q  is a dummy set to 1 for a quarterly earnings release after the adoption of Reg FD, and 0 otherwise. POSTFD_Bigi,q,  
POSTFD_Midi,q and POSTFD_Smalli,q are the interactions of POSTFDi,q with dummies identifying whether the firm belongs, respectively, to the portfolio of big, mid-
size or small firms. Details on the construction of portfolios of big, mid-size and small firms are described in the Appendix. The p-values are shown below each 
coefficient estimate. The sample comprises observations in the periods Q4:1997-Q3:1999 (pre-FD sample) and Q4:2000-Q3:2002 (post-FD sample), except that 
observations with actual earnings announcements between 12/20/1999 and 10/23/2000 are excluded.  
                            Panel A: Aggregating all data together                 Panel B: Running regressions in each group







POSTFD 0.0091 - 0.0021 - POSTFD 0.0005 0.0014 0.0046
<.0001 - 0.0023 - 0.6230 0.2165 0.0077
POSTFD_Big - 0.0081 - 0.0009 SIZE -0.0078 -0.0091 -0.0176
- <.0001 - 0.4052 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
POSTFD_Mid - 0.0093 - 0.0024 LOSS 0.0012 -0.0048 -0.0063
- <.0001 - 0.0251 0.5236 0.0080 0.0027
POSTFD_Small - 0.0109 - 0.0042 NEG_SURPRISE 0.0050 0.0067 0.0021
- <.0001 - 0.0045 <.0001 <.0001 0.1715
SIZE -0.0114 -0.0113 -0.0113 -0.0113 SURPRISE 0.6917 0.6118 0.5159
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
LOSS -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0039 ABSCAR 0.0554 0.0371 0.0325
0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
NEG_SURPRISE 0.0047 0.0047 0.0048 0.0048 SIGNCAR 0.0084 0.0053 0.0033
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0165
SURPRISE 0.5589 0.5577 0.5641 0.5626 VIX 0.0015 0.0016 0.0015
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
ABSCAR 0.0424 0.0425 0.0393 0.0393
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 # Observations 16366 18960 13304
SIGNCAR 0.0094 0.0094 0.0060 0.0060 R
2 0.076 0.054 0.045
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
VIX - - 0.0015 0.0015
- - <.0001 <.0001
# Observations 48630 48630 48630 48630
R
2 0.035 0.035 0.055 0.055    64
Table 8.   Fama-French Regression on Size-Based Portfolios 
This table presents results of regressions motivated by the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model for the portfolios of firms created based on the division by size. The 
dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly return of each size-based portfolio in excess of the T-bill. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB and HML are 
defined in Fama and French (1993). POSTFD is a dummy set to 1 for the months after Oct 2000, and 0 otherwise; POSTFD_SMB is the interaction of POSTFD and 
SMB.  The sample period is Jan 1997 to December 2002. 
 
 
                       Big firms                        Mid-size firms                       Small firms
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
Intercept 0.0016 0.0017 0.0018 0.0018 -0.0060 -0.0073 -0.0064 -0.0071 -0.0172 -0.0191 -0.0225 -0.0235
0.013 0.0085 0.0251 0.0211 0.2343 0.1408 0.3207 0.2628 0.0160 0.0066 0.0139 0.0088
RMRF 0.9789 0.9824 0.9779 0.9815 1.2653 1.2202 1.2672 1.2193 1.0489 0.9828 1.0712 1.0032
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SMB -0.0834 -0.0736 -0.0815 -0.0723 0.5982 0.4725 0.5946 0.4738 0.6470 0.4627 0.6048 0.4334
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0101 0.0005 0.0181
HML -0.0311 -0.0270 -0.0295 -0.0259 0.1342 0.0821 0.1314 0.0833 -0.0606 -0.1370 -0.0941 -0.1623
0.087 0.1401 0.1107 0.1646 0.3631 0.5734 0.3836 0.5754 0.7683 0.5008 0.6524 0.4318
POSTFD - - -0.0007 -0.0005 - - 0.0012 -0.0006 - - 0.0145 0.0120
- - 0.6169 0.6904 - - 0.9096 0.9585 - - 0.3396 0.4202
POSTFD_SMB - -0.0381 - -0.0372 - 0.4874 - 0.4884 - 0.7146 - 0.6932
- 0.1911 - 0.2065 - 0.0393 - 0.0410 - 0.0304 - 0.0367
# Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Adj R
2 0.992 0.992 0.991 0.992 0.766 0.778 0.763 0.774 0.606 0.627 0.605 0.625    65
Table 9. Fama-French Portfolios and the Period Post-Reg FD 
This table analyzes results based on the 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market from Fama and 
French (1993). Panels A and B presents results of regression based on the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor 
model for Fama-French 25 portfolios. The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly return of each 
portfolio in excess of the T-bill. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB and HML are defined in Fama and 
French (1993). POSTFD is a dummy set to 1 for the months after Oct 2000, and 0 otherwise; 
POSTFD_SMB is the interaction of POSTFD and SMB.  The sample period is Jan 1997 to December 2002. 
Panel C presents the correlation of returns between our portfolios of big, mid-size and small firms and the 
25 Fama-French portfolios for the period between Jan 1997 and Dec 2002. 
                Panel A: Fama-French results for the period between Jan 1997 and Dec 2002
                                     Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) quintiles
Size Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
RMRF t(RMRF)
Small 1.33 1.21 1.01 0.97 0.99 5.95 6.31 7.50 9.40 11.44
2 1.35 1.14 1.02 1.09 1.15 8.56 11.90 17.63 19.95 21.08
3 1.16 1.20 1.13 1.10 1.13 8.63 16.05 20.84 18.70 16.83
4 1.26 1.17 1.17 1.12 1.11 11.12 20.03 17.16 21.07 12.36
Big 0.91 1.02 0.98 0.94 0.95 25.59 14.60 11.88 9.56 8.29
SMB t(SMB)
Small 0.44 0.60 0.55 0.61 0.63 1.77 2.79 3.68 5.26 6.48
2 0.32 0.51 0.58 0.59 0.61 1.84 4.73 8.87 9.61 9.92
3 0.19 0.36 0.40 0.52 0.45 1.30 4.28 6.52 7.92 6.02
4 -0.01 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.31 -0.11 5.04 3.45 4.28 3.08
Big -0.25 0.03 0.10 0.13 0.21 -6.34 0.36 1.11 1.19 1.62
HML t(HML)
Small -0.20 0.30 0.47 0.62 0.67 -0.70 1.20 2.73 4.66 6.02
2 -0.04 0.51 0.69 0.91 0.97 -0.19 4.10 9.17 12.80 13.67
3 -0.30 0.57 0.83 1.00 0.94 -1.73 5.92 11.76 13.25 10.84
4 -0.14 0.66 0.84 0.85 0.87 -0.98 8.80 9.49 12.32 7.48
Big -0.34 0.37 0.42 0.76 0.74 -7.43 4.09 4.00 5.93 4.99
POSTFD_SMB t(POSTFD_SMB)
Small 0.72 0.56 0.30 0.27 0.41 1.56 1.42 1.07 1.24 2.27
2 0.76 0.57 0.37 0.37 0.65 2.35 2.89 3.07 3.25 5.79
3 0.66 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.31 2.39 1.26 1.15 0.24 2.22
4 0.57 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.03 2.43 -0.02 -0.25 0.15 0.16
Big -0.04 -0.06 0.16 -0.04 -0.69 -0.59 -0.44 0.93 -0.18 -2.91
R
2
Small 0.59 0.54 0.57 0.67 0.76
2 0.71 0.78 0.87 0.89 0.91
3 0.75 0.83 0.88 0.85 0.83
4 0.79 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.70
Big 0.96 0.79 0.72 0.59 0.53  
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                Panel B: Fama-French results for the period between Jul 1963 and Dec 2002
                                     Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) quintiles
Size Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High
RMRF t(RMRF)
Small 1.19 1.09 1.01 0.96 1.02 27.50 30.58 37.38 42.55 49.06
2 1.21 1.08 1.01 1.01 1.12 37.31 47.46 57.70 61.09 67.14
3 1.16 1.08 1.02 0.99 1.10 42.88 52.16 55.53 57.38 57.73
4 1.13 1.09 1.07 1.04 1.15 47.24 53.61 53.87 58.10 47.78
Big 0.95 1.01 0.95 0.96 1.00 66.97 54.99 44.61 44.94 35.67
SMB t(SMB)
Small 1.06 1.02 0.91 0.90 0.99 18.25 21.35 25.18 29.76 35.59
2 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.63 0.74 17.16 24.42 30.04 28.69 33.29
3 0.53 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.54 14.53 17.10 18.23 18.28 21.08
4 0.16 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.33 5.12 8.27 7.44 7.39 10.35
Big -0.23 -0.17 -0.17 -0.10 0.05 -11.93 -6.80 -5.96 -3.55 1.41
HML t(HML)
Small -0.13 0.25 0.42 0.54 0.73 -2.05 4.73 10.29 16.03 23.53
2 -0.26 0.25 0.45 0.63 0.82 -5.22 7.40 17.07 25.40 32.77
3 -0.33 0.25 0.50 0.65 0.81 -8.21 7.95 18.17 24.98 28.35
4 -0.33 0.25 0.49 0.63 0.79 -9.10 8.21 16.53 23.19 21.97
Big -0.39 0.10 0.24 0.58 0.74 -18.47 3.66 7.43 17.91 17.50
POSTFD_SMB t(POSTFD_SMB)
Small 0.19 0.18 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.97 1.14 -0.40 -0.20 0.73
2 0.29 0.26 0.15 0.24 0.46 2.00 2.51 1.95 3.26 6.18
3 0.31 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.18 2.51 -0.02 -0.11 0.29 2.12
4 0.37 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 3.40 -0.09 -0.67 0.45 -0.40
Big -0.09 0.04 0.37 0.12 -0.57 -1.47 0.50 3.82 1.27 -4.47
R
2
Small 0.79 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.91
2 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.94
3 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90
4 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.85
Big 0.94 0.88 0.82 0.81 0.74  
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  Panel C: Correlation of monthly returns of portfolio based on firm size and Fama-French portfolios, 1997:2002
                      Portfolio of big firms
Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) quintiles
Size Low 2 3 4 High
Small 0.63 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.61
2 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.63
3 0.75 0.81 0.76 0.65 0.69
4 0.83 0.84 0.76 0.76 0.68
Big 0.97 0.87 0.81 0.62 0.57
                      Portfolio of mid-size firms
Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) quintiles
Size Low 2 3 4 High
Small 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.83
2 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.78 0.79
3 0.95 0.80 0.64 0.54 0.56
4 0.94 0.66 0.49 0.57 0.43
Big 0.67 0.50 0.48 0.19 0.13
                      Portfolio of small firms
Book-to-market equity (BE/ME) quintiles
Size Low 2 3 4 High
Small 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.86
2 0.89 0.80 0.72 0.66 0.67
3 0.88 0.65 0.49 0.35 0.41
4 0.83 0.51 0.33 0.38 0.26
Big 0.56 0.37 0.37 0.05 -0.01    68
Table 10. Summary Results of Breaking Small Firms According to Analyst Following 
This table presents results involving the break-up of small firms according to analyst following 
characteristics. The first subgroup includes firms present in both pre-FD and post-FD periods and that have 
no analyst following in any of the firm-quarters of the sample. The second subgroup includes firms that had 
some analyst following in at least one of the pre-FD quarters but no analyst following in any of the post-FD 
quarters. The third subgroup includes all the remaining small firms. Panel A present univariate statistics 
based on these subgroups. Panel B presents results of running Fama-French regressions (as in Table 8) for 
all the small firms taken together as a group as well as for each subgroup of small firms defined above.  
.  
                                                   Panel A: Univariate statistics
# firms 3166 364 339 2463
Pre-FD Post-FD Pre-FD Post-FD Pre-FD Post-FD Pre-FD Post-FD
     S i z e  ( $ M M ) 7 2 6 8 4 65 4 7 64 6 7 77 6
Number of forecasts 1.40 1.00 0.00 0.35 1.27 0.00 1.72 1.34
  Pre-announcement 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.08
                                                   Panel B: Fama-French regressions
II I I I I I I I I I I
Intercept -0.0172 -0.0191 -0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0178 -0.0194 -0.0184 -0.0205
0.0160 0.0066 0.8163 0.6833 0.0054 0.0023 0.0123 0.0046
RMRF 1.0489 0.9828 0.8075 0.7716 1.0146 0.9610 1.0965 1.0251
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SMB 0.6470 0.4627 0.4933 0.3932 0.7216 0.5720 0.6675 0.4685
0.0001 0.0101 0.0005 0.0122 <.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.0111
HML -0.0606 -0.1370 0.1811 0.1397 0.3167 0.2547 -0.1366 -0.2190
0.7683 0.5008 0.3051 0.4321 0.0873 0.1647 0.5201 0.2957
POSTFD_SMB - 0.7146 - 0.3878 - 0.5804 - 0.7715
- 0.0304 - 0.1741 - 0.0491 - 0.0231
# Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Adj R
2 0.606 0.627 0.475 0.481 0.575 0.593 0.628 0.650
All small firms
Small firms with no
analyst following
pre-FD or post-FD
Small firms with some 
analyst following pre-




Small firms with no
analyst following
pre-FD
Small firms with some 
analyst following pre-
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Table 11. Summary Results of Breaking Firms in Groups based on Size and on Intangibles 
This table presents results involving the break-up of sample in groups based on size (big, mid-size and small firms) and intangibles (low and high). Panel A presents 
results on panel data regressions. The first column under each variable presents the estimates of post-FD dummies corresponding to each group definition in multivariate 
panel data regressions (other coefficients’ estimates are omitted) as done before for the break-up on size alone, with the exception that now we also include book-to-
market and intangibles as control variables; for the analyst following regression we start from specification VI in Table 2, for the pre-announcement regression we start 
from specification V in Table 5, for the forecast error regression we start from specification IV in Table 6 and for volatility regression we start from specification IV in 
Table 7; and then we add book-to-market and intangibles as regressors. The second column under each variable is computed by dividing the post-FD dummy by the pre-
FD average of that variable (except for pre-announcement, when we show simply the pre-FD average). The intra-group differential impact shows p-values of tests of 
differences in intra-group coefficients on high and low intangibles. Panel B presents results of running Fama-French regressions for each group of firms; each row 
presents the coefficients estimates of SMB and POSTFD_SMB regressors from running specification type II in Table 8 (other coefficients’ estimates are omitted). 
                                     Panel A: Panel data regressions    Panel B: Fama-French Regressions





















































































































































































































































Big size, low 3.65E-05 0.0660 2.32 0.0917 -8.34E-05 -0.0215 1.70E-03 0.0214 -0.1201 0.0387
intangible <.0001 (<.0001) 0.5268 0.2744 0.0001 0.4927
Big size, high  3.13E-05 0.0581 1.79 0.1123 7.65E-05 0.0211 -1.42E-03 -0.0175 -0.0203 -0.1121
intangible <.0001 (<.0001) 0.7244 0.3796 0.6134 0.1339
Mid-size, low -1.13E-05 -0.0545 1.83 0.0836 5.58E-04 0.0908 -5.44E-04 -0.0058 0.4514 0.5467
intangible <.0001 (<.0001) 0.0075 0.7269 0.0028 0.0435
Mid-size, high -2.12E-05 -0.0902 1.71 0.1109 2.38E-04 0.0426 3.59E-03 0.0352 0.5366 0.5065
intangible <.0001 (<.0001) 0.2733 0.0232 <.0001 0.0367
Small size, low -7.63E-06 -0.1111 1.08 0.0609 1.57E-03 0.1596 -5.40E-03 -0.0461 0.4175 0.6534
intangible 0.0006 0.1020 <.0001 0.0219 0.0228 0.0528
Small size, high -1.89E-05 -0.2182 1.01 0.0871 1.24E-03 0.1623 8.70E-03 0.0769 0.5248 0.7520
intangible <.0001 0.6721 <.0001 <.0001 0.0029 0.0195
# Observations 56634 31155 41399 43927
R
2 0.152 0.096 0.031 0.056
Intra-group differencial impact in High vs Low (p-value)
Big size 0.1011 0.1620 0.5853 0.1515
Mid-size 0.0009 0.8870 0.2764 0.0541
Small Size <.0001 0.0610 0.4609 <.0001  
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Table 12. Summary Results of Breaking Big Firms between Democracies and Dictatorships 
This table presents results involving the break-up of big firms between democracies and dictatorships. Big are defined as described in the Appendix; democracies 
(dictatorships) are firms with average G in the lowest (highest) quintile of the distribution of G among all firms in the sample. Panel A presents results on panel data 
regressions. The first column under each variable presents the estimates of post-FD dummies corresponding to each group definition in multivariate panel data 
regressions (other coefficients’ estimates are omitted) as done before for the break-up on size alone; for the analyst following regression we use specification VI in Table 
2, for the pre-announcement regression we use specification V in Table 5, for the forecast error regression we use specification IV in Table 6 and for volatility 
regression we use specification IV in Table 7. The second column under each variable is computed by dividing the post-FD dummy by the pre-FD average of that 
variable (except for pre-announcement, when we show simply the pre-FD average). The intra-group differential impact shows p-values of tests of differences in intra-
group coefficients on high and low G. Panel B presents results of running Fama-French regressions for each group of firms; each row presents the coefficients estimates 
of SMB and POSTFD_SMB regressors from running specification type II in Table 8 (other coefficients’ estimates are omitted). 
 
                                     Panel A: Panel data regressions Panel B: Fama-French Regressions





















































































































































































































































Big size, low g 2.42E-05 0.0462 2.28 0.0800 -2.49E-04 -0.0636 -2.67E-03 -0.0292 -0.0875 -0.0169
<.0001 (<.0001) 0.2844 0.3064 0.0235 0.8096
Big size, high g 8.14E-06 0.0138 2.27 0.1100 -7.81E-05 -0.0259 -5.06E-03 -0.0751 0.0422 -0.2181
0.0325 (<.0001) 0.8229 0.0535 0.5346 0.0921
# Observations 56634 31155 41399 43927
R
2 0.161 0.096 0.032 0.056
Intra-group differencial impact in High vs Low (p-value)
Big size 0.0025 0.4450 0.8270 0.5152  
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Table 13. Summary Results of Breaking Firms in Groups based on Size and on Litigation Risk Industries 
This table presents results involving the break-up of sample in groups based on size (big, mid-size and small firms) and industries subject to litigation risk (low and high 
risk). Big, mid-size and small firms are defined as described in the Appendix; inside each group of firms based on size, we define a firm as having high litigation risk if 
belongs to a high litigation risk industry, i.e. with SICCD in the ranges 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7379 or 8731-8734. Panel A presents 
results on panel data regressions. The first column under each variable presents the estimates of post-FD dummies corresponding to each group definition in multivariate 
panel data regressions (other coefficients’ estimates are omitted) as done before for the break-up on size alone; for the analyst following regression we use specification 
VI in Table 2, for the pre-announcement regression we use specification V in Table 5, for the forecast error regression we use specification IV in Table 6 and for 
volatility regression we use specification IV in Table 7. The second column under each variable is computed by dividing the post-FD dummy by the pre-FD average of 
that variable (except for pre-announcement, when we show simply the pre-FD average). The intra-group differential impact shows p-values of tests of differences in 
intra-group coefficients on high and low litigation risk. Panel B presents results of running Fama-French regressions for each group of firms; each row presents the 
coefficients estimates of SMB and POSTFD_SMB regressors from running specification type II in Table 8 (other coefficients’ estimates are omitted). 
                                     Panel A: Panel data regressions    Panel B: Fama-French Regressions





















































































































































































































































Big size, low 2.34E-05 0.0458 1.84 0.0953 5.20E-05 0.0150 -1.78E-03 -0.0258 0.0713 -0.1108
litigation risk <.0001 (<.0001) 0.6399 0.1785 0.2530 0.3398
Big size, high  6.60E-05 0.1033 2.23 0.1169 -6.93E-04 -0.1518 6.05E-03 0.0546 -0.2973 0.0783
litigation risk <.0001 (<.0001) 0.0186 0.0054 <.0001 0.5248
Mid-size, low -2.23E-05 -0.1035 1.56 0.0894 6.08E-04 0.1195 -1.20E-03 -0.0138 0.5657 0.3526
litigation risk <.0001 (<.0001) 0.0006 0.3626 <.0001 0.0051
Mid-size, high 4.59E-07 0.0020 1.89 0.1146 -1.86E-04 -0.0233 8.43E-03 0.0681 0.3749 0.7680
litigation risk 0.8704 (<.0001) 0.5154 <.0001 0.0828 0.0592
Small size, low -1.35E-05 -0.1756 1.08 0.0681 1.73E-03 0.2375 1.72E-03 0.0162 0.5799 0.3916
litigation risk <.0001 0.4045 <.0001 0.3586 <.0001 0.0676
Small size, high -1.28E-05 -0.1639 1.02 0.0854 3.08E-04 0.0265 4.05E-03 0.0300 0.3512 0.1248
litigation risk <.0001 0.8752 0.4859 0.1864 0.1365 0.0112
# Observations 56634 31155 41399 43927
R
2 0.154 0.096 0.032 0.056
Intra-group differencial impact in High vs Low (p-value)
Big size <.0001 0.0450 0.0172 0.0016
Mid-size <.0001 0.0350 0.0158 <.0001
Small Size 0.8388 0.8390 0.0049 0.5088    72
Table 14. Size Summary Statistics for Groups of Firms 
This table presents summary statistics on the partition of the sample in groups of big, mid and small firms, 
based on firm-quarter observations. Age is defined as the difference between year of current observation 
and the first year firm data is available on CRSP database. Size is the market value of the firm at the last 
day of the month in which the quarterly earnings announcement is made. Log scaled size is the log of the 
market value of firm scaled by the market index. Panel B presents for each group the fraction (in 
percentage terms) of firm-quarters that belongs to each Fama and French (1997) industry. Details on the 
construction of portfolios of big, mid-size and small firms are described in the Appendix. The sample 
comprises observations in the periods Q4:1997-Q3:1999 (pre-FD sample) and Q4:2000-Q3:2002 (post-FD 
sample), except that observations with actual earnings announcements between 12/20/1999 and 10/23/2000 
are excluded.  
                                                Panel A: Summary statistics on number of firms, age and size
        Group of big firms  Group of mid-size firms     Group of small firms
All Pre-FD Post-FD All Pre-FD Post-FD All Pre-FD Post-FD
# Firms 1371 2035 3166
NYSE 925 643 257
NASDAQ 446 1392 2909
Age
Mean 24.7 24.4 24.9 13.0 12.8 13.2 10.3 9.4 11.4
Median 18.0 18.0 18.0 9.0 8.0 9.0 7.0 6.0 8.0
# Firm-quarters 16,752 8,495 8,257 21,237 10,598 10,639 25,117 13,357 11,760
Size (MM)
Mean 9,619 8,854 10,405 432 417 448 71 73 68
Median 2,609 2,478 2,731 349 338 359 53 55 49
Std Dev 26,734 24,217 29,078 328 322 333 67 66 69
Log scaled size
M e a n 8 . 07 . 98 . 1 5 . 75 . 65 . 8 3 . 83 . 83 . 7
Median 7.7 7.7 7.8 5.7 5.7 5.8 3.8 3.9 3.8
Std Dev 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0  

















































Agriculture 0.4 0.1 0.3 Construction 0.7 1.4 1.0 Business services 10.0 13.4 13.5
Food products 2.3 1.0 1.1 Steel works etc 1.5 2.0 1.3 Computers 3.5 3.3 5.6
Candy and soda 0.2 0.1 0.1 Fabricated prods 0.0 0.5 0.5 Electronic eq. 5.7 5.9 5.7
Alcoholic Bev 0.5 0.1 0.4 Machinery 2.8 3.4 2.9 Meas. & control eq. 1.5 1.6 2.8
Tobacco prods 0.1 0.1 0.0 Electrical eq. 0.7 1.1 1.0 Business supplies 1.9 1.1 0.7
Recreational prods 0.3 0.7 1.2 Miscelaneous 0.5 0.2 0.5 Shipping Cont. 0.3 0.5 0.1
Entertainment 1.2 1.5 1.2 Auto and trucks 1.4 1.7 1.0 Transportation 2.7 2.6 2.0
Print & publishing 1.9 0.5 0.5 Aircraft 0.5 0.2 0.2 Wholesale 2.1 3.9 3.9
Consumer Goods 1.5 1.7 1.5 Shipb. , railroad eq. 0.2 0.2 0.2 Retail 6.7 5.0 5.0
Apparel 0.6 1.5 1.6 Defense 0.2 0.1 0.1 Restaurantes etc 1.1 1.8 2.2
Healthcare 1.3 1.1 1.5 Precious metals 0.2 0.1 0.1 Banking  10.0 11.1 16.3
Medical eq 1.5 2.6 5.5 Nonmetalic mining 0.3 0.3 0.1 Insurance 6.2 3.4 2.1
Pharmac. prods 4.1 6.7 4.7 Coal  0.0 0.1 0.0 Real estate 0.2 0.4 0.5
Chemicals 2.8 1.5 0.8 Petro and nat gas 3.7 2.8 2.1 Trading 2.4 1.2 1.2
Rubber and plastic 0.5 0.8 1.1 Utilities 7.5 2.7 1.2 Unindentified 0.3 0.8 0.8
Textiles 0.1 0.6 0.8 Telecom 4.1 3.0 0.8
Construction mat. 1.4 2.4 1.4 Personal services 0.5 1.1 1.2  
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Figure 1. Quarterly Fraction of Companies Using Pre-Announcements 
This figure presents the quarterly fraction of companies that issues at least one pre-announcement between 
15 days before the end of the quarter  and 2 days before the actual release of that quarter’s earnings 
announcement. The vertical lines indicate the period when Reg FD was being proposed and discussed; the 
pre-FD period thus finishes before the first vertical line and the post-FD period starts after the second 
vertical line. The break-up of companies on the groups based on size (big, mid and small companies) is 
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Figure 2. Quarterly Fraction of Firms without Forecasts Available 
This figure presents the quarterly fraction of firm-quarters in each group that have at least one forecast 
available for the upcoming earnings announcement. The vertical lines indicate the period when Reg FD 
was being proposed and discussed; the pre-FD period thus finishes before the first vertical line and the 
post-FD period starts after the second vertical line. The break-up of companies on the groups based on size 
(big, mid and small companies) is described in the Appendix.  
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Figure 3. Quarterly Average Volatility (Market Response) at Earnings Announcements 
This figure presents the quarterly average volatility for each group of firms. Volatility is the cumulative 
absolute abnormal return over the window [-1,+1] around the earnings announcement day. The vertical 
lines indicate the period when Reg FD was being proposed and discussed; the pre-FD period thus finishes 
before the first vertical line and the post-FD period starts after the second vertical line. The break-up of 
companies on the groups based on size (big, mid and small companies) is described in the Appendix.  
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Figure 4. Quarterly Fraction of Firms Using Conference Calls around Earnings Announcements 
This figure presents the fraction of firms in each group that uses conference calls (from FirstCall) at the 
window [-1,+1] around the current quarter’s earnings announcement day. The vertical lines indicate the 
period when Reg FD was being proposed and discussed; the pre-FD period thus finishes before the first 
vertical line and the post-FD period starts after the second vertical line. The break-up of companies on the 
groups based on size (big, mid and small companies) is described in the Appendix.  
 
 












Quarters (Pre−FD is Q4:1997 thru Q3:1999, Post−FD is Q4:2000 thru Q3:2002)
Big companies
Mid companies
Small companies
 
 
 
 